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Abstract
Natural language processing algorithms (NLP) have become an essential approach for pro-
cessing large amounts of textual information with applications such as spam, phishing and
content moderation. Malicious actors can craft manipulated inputs to fool NLP classifiers
into making incorrect predictions. A large challenge with evaluating these adversarial at-
tacks is the trade-off between attack efficiency and text quality. Higher constraints on the
attack search space will improve text quality but reduce the attack success rate. In this
thesis, I introduce a framework for the evaluation of NLP classifier robustness. Black-box
attack algorithms are paired with a threat modelling system to apply a customizable set of
constraints to the adversarial generation process. I introduce a mixed-method experimen-
tal design approach that combines metrics that compare how many adversarial documents
can be made versus the impact the attack has on the text’s quality. Measuring the attack
efficiency involves combining the computational cost and success rate of the attack. To
measure the text quality, an experimental study is run in which human participants report
their subjective perception of text manipulation. I present a set of equations to reconcile
the trade-offs between these tests to find an optimal balance. This pairing bridges the au-
tomated evaluation of the classifier decisions with the semantic insight of human reviewers.
The methodology is then extended to evaluate adversarial training as a defence method using
the threat modelling system. The framework is also paired with a collection of visualization
tools to provide greater interpretability. Domain-agnostic tools for classifier behaviour are
first presented, followed by an interactive document viewer that enables exploration of the
attack search space and word-level feature importance. The framework proposed in this
thesis supports any black-box attack and is model-agnostic, which offers a wide range of
applicability. The end objective is a more unified, guided and transparent way to evaluate
classifier robustness that is flexible and customizable.
Keywords: adversarial machine learning; robustness evaluation; natural language pro-
cessing; text classification; information visualization;
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The world we live in has increasingly become data-driven. By 2025 there are predicted to
be over 41 billion internet-connected devices [20]. With an exponentially growing amount of
digitally collected data [95], the ability to analyze data in an automated way is essential. This
places great importance on Machine Learning (ML) approaches which have the ability to
learn and provide predictions on data automatically. Natural language processing algorithms
(NLP) have become a very useful approach for text classification, with large implications
for cybersecurity. Spam and phishing detectors as well as content moderation are just some
of the many applications that make use of NLP classification. These NLP systems take the
form of a machine learning model that is trained on large collections of text. The objective of
the classifier is to receive an input (a document), and predict which category the document
best belongs to. As people around the world have become reliant on NLP powered digital
services, the performance of these classifiers is imperative.
While research had previously been focused on model research and design, the op-
erations and deployment of models are becoming more important in the success of ML
projects [7]. The actual successful deployment of a model still remains a large challenge
for many organizations. In a recent survey on Artificial Intelligent (AI) use in business,
over three quarters say that business adoption of AI is a great challenge [78]. More than
90% of respondents reported that people, processes and culture are the main challenges for
technology adoption. Only 15% of those surveyed have deployed AI models broadly [78].
It is predicted that through 2022, 80% of AI projects will be designed in ways that do not
adapt to the scale of an entire organization and with only 20% of projects delivering business
outcomes [41]. These issues highlight the increasing importance of establishing more formal
processes for AI development. With such a large gap between building a model and putting
it into production, new processes are needed for a more consistent and thorough system
of model development. Amongst all of these findings a consistent theme is emerging: An
1
increasing need for a coordinated and consistent approach to handling ML, yet a large gap
in actual deployment success.
With the amount of online discussion increasing quickly, the ability to process this data
efficiently is crucial. Tools are needed to quickly transform this data into formats that can
be automated. Natural language processing algorithms (NLP) are being used for many es-
sential security applications. Classification is needed to either accept or reject data based
on properties learned to be either safe or malicious. These NLP approaches are necessary
to keep users safe in the digital world. In recent years with advances in techniques includ-
ing deep neural networks and transfer learning, the performance of many natural language
processing techniques (NLP) has been rapidly improving [2]. These methods assume that
the classifier input has not been manipulated [57]. Adversarial machine learning involves
situations in which input data can be purposely generated by an adversary who wishes
to manipulate the results of a classifier. By using data from outside the trained distribu-
tion, malicious users can exploit the system by changing the assigned output class without
significantly changing the content.
The growing reliance on machine learning brings greater risk to attacks from adver-
saries. Beginning with spam and phishing evasion [17], adversarial machine learning is
expanding to even more domains as automated learning approaches become part of many
new applications. This means that the attack surface for adversarial machine learning will
begin to grow exponentially. Malicious actors can explore large amounts of the input feature
space either through brute force or other advanced strategies. This can increase the chal-
lenge of handling out of distribution data compared to natural mistakes in situations such as
inadvertent spelling errors. With such a large influx of information, analysts are not able to
identify threats in a timely manner leading to exploits persisting in models and only discov-
ered once the damage has already been done [92]. The robustness of models is increasingly
important as machine learning becomes a core component of many organizations [41].
Beginning with adversarial examples for computer vision [97], the increasing popularity
of deep learning has brought more attention to the susceptibility of deep learning models
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to these attacks. While adversarial environments have been studied for some time [17],
it is only recently with these increasingly complex classifiers the issue has become more
prevalent. While the majority of the related work has centred around computer vision [6],
recently, there has been a focus on NLP [109].
In the realm of text data, attacks consist of modifying the input to text classifiers
such that the semantics are similar to the original but the output scores from the classifier
are drastically different. Generating adversaries for text brings additional challenges not
found in the continuous data space of computer vision. For example, the common evasion
technique for computer vision is to slightly change each feature (pixel) by a small amount.
Each pixel can have its colours shifted very slightly without being noticed by a human [6].
This type of manipulation is more challenging for NLP as the data features are discrete.
One cannot simply alter a word slightly without being noticed. Either a misspelled word or
an entirely new word must be swapped with the original. While words can be converted to
vector embeddings in a continuous space, a slight shift in the vector space is unlikely to land
on another word [109]. This means that instead of moving all words slightly, one needs to
choose specific words that will be modified. Due to the large vocabulary space of languages,
the same idea can be expressed in many ways, providing the flexibility to construct alternate
phrasings. With this ability, the goal for an adversary in the text domain is to change a text
so that the predicted class is changed but a human would still obtain the same meaning as
the original document.
When developing NLP applications, if a word is replaced with another that has a very
different meaning it should alter the classification. However, with adversarial examples, score
changes can occur even when swapping semantically equivalent words [9]. Related works
have demonstrated that state-of-the-art classifiers are vulnerable to manipulation [103].
Any security system, such as a spam filter, using such models has the possibility of being
exploited.
In addition to direct manipulation by a malicious actor, robustness testing has added
benefits including worse case performance evaluations and insights into machine learning
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innovations. Non-adversarial threats to models can also impair the ability of a model to
perform properly such as words or tokens outside the vocabulary of a model or unintentional
misspellings. Performing robustness assessments can help address these other challenges as
well. Additionally, by examining the weaknesses of the classifiers one can learn to better
understand the characteristics of models and can potentially craft newer variants more
powerful than before. As humans are often not tricked by the same examples that can fool
a model, this indicates a gap in knowledge that can be studied for improved model efficacy.
As the world moves into a more digital age, the amount of cyber threats has been
increasing rapidly [20]. From the perspective of an attacker, potential targets for the attack
could include spamming, phishing attacks, online harassment and the spread of misleading
information. Therefore, it is imperative that methods are developed to increase the robust-
ness of NLP classification. To do this, we need a way to quantify the vulnerabilities in
the machine learning models that are being used. The manipulation of NLP classifiers has
the potential to influence a very vulnerable part of many organizations: the people within
them. Attacks targeting the human side of an organization rather than technical barriers
are known as social engineering attacks. These are a pervasive threats targeting employees
at all level of an organization (executives, administrators, etc.). The weakest link of an
organization can be a single employee without the proper awareness and training which is
exploited by the adversary [71]. These types of attacks continue to be on the rise with ob-
jectives from stealing intellectual property, personally identifiable information or financial
data [20]. In addition to targeting individuals, there exist widespread instances of misinfor-
mation campaigns. The Canadian Center for Cyber Security (CCCS) reports rapid growth
in instances of social engineering attacks and describes efforts to influence public discourse
through social media as “the new normal” [20]. These threats illustrate the importance of
properly securing the systems that permit or deny such malicious content.
Organizations need to improve the security of their ML classifiers against adversaries
while at the same time ensuring that the performance of the models is not impaired signifi-
cantly. The data science and development teams are primarily concerned with performance
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metrics including accuracy and computational efficiency, whereas the security teams are con-
cerned about the adversarial robustness of any system as this increases the attack surface
of the organization. There is a greater need for collaboration between ML researchers, de-
velopment and operation teams as well as the IT security teams. A more tightly integrated
development cycle is essential for the introduction of machine learning into core business
solutions.
1.2 Statement of Problem
In the literature, many definitions have been used to describe the performance of an NLP
model under attack [109]. Terms such as robustness, reliability, resilience and stability are
used, often interchangeably. For clarity, in this thesis, the terms robustness and reliability
will be used. Robustness is defined as how well a given model handles adversarial inputs,
the degree to which a perturbation of the input to the classifier results in a change to the
output score of the model. A robust model is more stable and therefore more predictable
in the scores it generates. A less robust model can have a drastically different score for
seemingly very similar inputs. Reliability will be used as a term to describe the broader
goal of how well a model performs with unexpected data as a whole such as edge cases
and out of distribution data. The scope of the thesis is on robustness in which we address
adversaries. However, as our definition of robustness has large overlap with reliability, our
goal is to indirectly improve overall reliability as well.
When text is manipulated to fool an NLP model, the information within becomes
degraded to some extent. An attack that always fools the model but generates random
output would not be useful. For example, it is useless to create spam that can pass a filter
if no one can understand it. If an adversary was only able to fool a model if the content and
meaning have been manipulated beyond recognition then it would be reasonable to expect
the model to be fooled. To what degree the message has been degraded depends largely
on the subjective perception of people reading the text. Additionally, automated classifiers
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tasked with identifying mistakes often ignore issues that should be obvious to a person [109].
This means it is important to have metrics for gauging the impact on human subjects.
Focusing entirely on text quality would also produce ineffective results. The efficiency of
the attack process also plays an important role. An attack that generates perfectly formed
documents would not be very useful if it cannot successfully fool the model or only work
on an extremely small percentage of documents. Therefore a balance between these two
factors is essential. How to balance these trade-offs depends on many factors including the
attack algorithm being used, the constraints being applied to the attack process and what
percentage of inputs are expected to be manipulated.
Being able to easily manage different versions of an ML model is important for com-
paring one’s available options and choosing the best one for deployment. Having control of
various model versions is also important for iterative model development. Reproducibility
is essential as being able to reproduce results is a key component for accurate performance
evaluations. Not being able to recreate results would make sharing findings and making im-
provements difficult. Both versioning and reproducibility are found to be some of the largest
ML challenges in putting a model into production. In a survey of enterprise organizations,
over 41% reported this as a key challenge to ML deployment [7]. With so many organiza-
tions feeling unprepared with these factors of success, they are a major hurdle that needs
to be overcome for the successful integration of machine learning with their core business
operations. In order to reach ML maturity and be confident enough to deploy models, these
issues must be a key focus for machine learning developers.
Evaluating trade-offs for either an attacker or defender of a classifier is also an impor-
tant challenge. Different attacks may place more importance on the quantity or quality
of the documents that reach an end recipient. For example, a more sophisticated threat
actor might want a more targeted attack such as spear-phishing where the message is sent
to a particular small group or individual person [19]. For example, an email may target an
executive-level member of an organization to fool them into disclosing important informa-
tion. A spear-phishing attack would want documents of the highest quality as they need
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to convince an administrator to take action. As a specific deliberate action is needed, the
target may be extra cautious and review the document more carefully. Compare this to a
more general phishing attack or spam where some text quality may be traded for an in-
creased count of emails reaching the recipients. A misinformation campaign might be even
less concerned with quality and want a larger overall reach and influence. While text quality
is still important, it may not be worth the trade-off of having a smaller reach. These are just
some examples of potential threats and needed trade-off assessments. For these reasons, we
need a way to properly assess these trade-offs and make decisions based on the performance
of a classifier’s robustness.
In addition to issues with evaluation and trade-offs, there are challenges when trying
to improve models. Trying to troubleshoot the reasons for a lack of model robustness is
complicated because of poor model interpretability. Deep learning classifiers essentially act
as a black box with seemingly random reasoning as to the decision of the model [5]. Due
to this, it can be hard to determine how a change to the input will influence the output.
With an output that cannot be explained, there is a large amount of distrust in the overall
system. Even if a detection system had near-perfect accuracy, without any context it would
not be adopted by a machine learning user [94].
To properly account for all these considerations, a consistent yet customizable method-
ology for performing robustness evaluations on text classifiers is needed. It is also important
for our process to be understandable and trustworthy, meaning tools for more interpretable
machine learning evaluation must be made. Addressing all of these challenges is essential
for improving the success rate of getting NLP models into production.
1.3 Contribution
To address the aforementioned challenges, in this thesis I propose a framework for evaluating
the robustness of NLP classifiers. This is composed of an attack algorithm paired with a
threat modelling system that can be used to attack any text classifier. The attack algorithm
7
can be any black-box search approach used to build the adversarial inputs. This is done by
iteratively manipulating input samples until the text has been transformed into a successful
adversarial example. The objective is to test the extent to which the classifier is suscep-
tible to being fooled. I introduce a set of definitions that describe important factors one
should consider when assessing the quality of an adversarial document. To implement the
enforcement of these factors, the threat model applies constraints to the attack algorithm
in the form of thresholds using word embedding distances and a language model. These
constraints reduce the search space of the attack algorithm. This results in higher quality
texts that are more convincing for people but less likely to fool a model. We evaluate three
different levels of constraints to assess these trade-offs. The framework is a black-box and
model agnostic system that can be used for any new or existing NLP classifier.
To evaluate the attack simulations run using this framework, I propose a hybrid ap-
proach that combines automated performance metrics as well as a human participants study.
This hybrid approach considers both the technical feasibility of an attack as well as the sub-
jective perception of text manipulation. The automated metrics combine the success rate
for fooling the classifier and the computational cost of running the attack. The human par-
ticipants study is divided into three tasks: class preservation, grammar quality and semantic
similarity. These tasks are demonstrated with a crowdsourced study on two datasets and
three constraint levels.
I present a set of equations for deciding which threat model is best to apply in a
given use case. After running tests on different constraint levels, the user can combine
the results into a single efficacy score. This provides a unified way to assess the trade-
off between the quantity and quality of adversarial documents using different constraint
levels. The equations account for the priorities of the user by using customized weightings
towards efficiency or any text quality metric. Using this methodology a user can obtain an
answer tailored to their test results and priorities. By changing the weightings the user can
quickly adapt to new assumptions about the attack environment or changing priorities. This
process provides a consistent methodology for robustness evaluation that is both flexible and
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customizable.
I also demonstrate the methodology for evaluating defence methods used for robustness
improvements. I test adversarial training using samples built by different constraint levels.
I also propose an iterative evaluation approach, to study how the attack efficiency and
performance of the models change over time. These tests provide a proof of concept for
further defence research on adversarial environments and are compatible with any other
black box defence methods. This work aims to bridge the gap between model attacks and
turning those into actionable intelligence for choosing more suitable defence operations.
To improve interpretability, various uses of visualization for different stages of the ro-
bustness evaluation process have been developed. This starts with an exploratory data
analysis tool used for comparing and selecting models prior to adversarial testing. This is
a domain-agnostic visualization tool developed for assessing the performance of any ma-
chine learning classifier. This helps to establish an understanding of the initial weaknesses
of any classifier. Following this, visual analytics dashboards specific to the domain of text
classification are presented. The user can control the test parameters and ensure that the
proper threat models are being adhered to within the adversarial simulation. Information
such as feature importance and model decisions can be reviewed as the training process
evolves. This is the first use of visual analytics for the analysis of text classifiers in ad-
versarial environments. After adversarial testing, a novel defence review dashboard allows
users to compare iterations of a trained model and compare how the decision of the model
changes over time for any selected adversarial example. In addition to using these tools for
robustness evaluation, they can be used as a way to combat adversaries by using it as an
educational tool to demonstrate adversarial weaknesses.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses background knowledge
in the subject area as well as related works. Chapter 3 introduces the framework including
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design requirements and a description of all framework components. Chapter 4 covers the
experimental design of the tests. Chapter 5 goes over the results of the experiments. Chapter
6 is a demonstration of the framework for studying adversarial defence methods. Chapter
7 covers use cases into model evaluation and interpretability used as baseline assessment
tool prior to threat modelling. Chapter 8 presents dashboard views for attack and defence
evaluation. Lastly, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.
1.5 Summary
As the world becomes increasingly dependant on NLP classifiers, we must increase our
efforts in ensuring that they are robust to manipulation from adversaries. Text documents
can be manipulated by a malicious actor such that the meaning is preserved yet the NLP
model will make an incorrect prediction. How well the meaning is preserved however, is
largely dependant on the constraint applied to the attack search space. Greater constraints
can help to craft higher quality documents but the trade-off is a smaller percentage of the
documents fooling the classifier. These trade-off factors must be considered by an adversary
and can also be used by the NLP model owner to better anticipate attacks against their
classifier. By producing a threat modelling system that simulates an adversary, a user can
proactively improve defence by testing adversarial attacks. In summary, this work aims to
make the following contributions:
• A customizable threat modelling system to evaluate the trade-offs of dif-
ferent attack constraints.
• The implementation of a system architecture used to evaluate the threat
modelling system, demonstrated with three different levels of constraints.
• A mixed-method experimental design approach combining human partici-
pants and automated metrics.
• A set of equations to compare the overall efficacy of the different constraint
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levels that combines both quantitative and qualitative measures.
• A methodology for extending the threat modelling system for evaluating
defence strategies, including the proposal of an iterative training approach.
• A collection of visualization tools that augment the framework with inter-
pretability methods.
11
2 Background and Related Works
Over the last few years, there have been a large number of advancements in the field of
NLP. With the amount of text information being processed growing exponentially [95], NLP
approaches have become essential to automating the process. The complexity of NLP models
has increased over time as deep neural networks and transfer learning has become common.
The prevalence of these automated systems for handling text inputs has made them a
target for attack by adversaries. In this chapter, I will discuss background knowledge and
related works relevant to the proposed methodology for evaluating NLP classifier robustness.
Starting with a general overview of adversarial machine learning, we then discuss NLP
attacks followed by methods of assessing text quality and robustness. We finish we an
overview of visualization tools for increasing machine learning interpretability.
2.1 MLOps and Quality Assurance
Combining the development of software with the IT operations needed for successful de-
ployment is known as DevOps [12]. This is a methodology with aspects from agile software
development and helps to shorten development life cycles, provide continuous delivery and
overall aims for higher quality software. By extension, MLOps can be defined as “the exten-
sion of the DevOps methodology to include Machine Learning and Data Science assets as
first-class citizens within the DevOps ecology” [4]. This means that rather than having the
machine learning aspects of a system behave as a separate entity, they are tightly integrated
with the overall software development. Now that machine learning is starting to play a key
role in many organizations, MLOps has become a focus for both businesses and the research
community. As the technology used in NLP algorithms matures, a shifting interest from
development to reliability and accountability has increased [4].
From the perspective of the software engineering framework of technical debt [50],
the quick and easy deployment of models incurs increasingly costly maintenance costs over
time. A model optimized and trained on a small training and testing set is likely to have
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reliability issues as the data distribution shifts over time. Machine learning models are
especially vulnerable to technical debt because they have the regular maintenance factors
of traditional code but also have additional ML related challenges [91].
This additional debt may be more difficult to address as it is not code but rather the
behaviour of the model. Traditional technical debt is mitigated by having a clear separation
of boundaries by using modular components and performing unit tests for specific behaviour.
Machine learning models on the other hand are used when we do not have this clear definition
of behaviour. The behaviour is not able to be expressed without the dependency on external
data [91]. By being modelled on data and not explicitly designed with specific constraints
they are harder to predict and adapt. Additionally, the non-linearity of many models means
that changing one parameter can have impacts in many places, making it harder to isolate
impacts and guarantee performance.
Optimizing model parameters and performing feature engineering on a dataset are
important steps in achieving a high performing machine learning model [11]. This however
is only the first step in having a successful deployment of a model. To bring a classifier
into production, performance assessments are needed to ensure it meets the objectives of an
organization. Evaluating the performance of a model is typically done using several splits
of a dataset for training, validation and then a testing set. The performance of the model
is then measured as the accuracy of the held-out testing set. There is the potential for
issues to be prevalent in all of these splits meaning that the accuracy of the testing set may
be hiding vulnerabilities inherent to the entire dataset such as a lack of representation for
certain behaviours such as sentences with negation.
To help address these issues, techniques such as challenge datasets have been used which
can be used to query a model with specific hand-made inputs to test the model for specific
issues. As an example to address sentence negation, a dataset for sentiment analysis could
include sentences with a negation such as “I did not like the movie.” which would be tested
to have the opposite prediction of “I liked the movie.”. A drawback of this approach is
the limited scalability and being hand made may reduce the realism of the examples [14].
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Additionally, the majority of datasets are focused on natural language inference or question
answering tasks. An alternative for a more scalable and task-agnostic approach is a testing
tool called CheckList [85]. Extending concepts from software engineering quality assurance,
it acts as a sort of unit testing tool for NLP. This is a tool that presents a set of templates that
can be filled in by users to create rule sets of examples to test against the model. It includes
testing categories such as negations, vocabulary swaps and named entity recognition.
The tests that CheckList performs matches with our definition of reliability, a high-
level assessment of how the model performs under different inputs, by switching the words
used to check for behaviour that differs from what would be expected. While this pro-
cess is similar to the adversarial generation process done in this thesis, there are a few key
differences. Instead of checking against a list of issues, the attack testing done as part of
this thesis assumes a malicious actor is repeatedly attempting to manipulate the model.
Whereas CheckList performs a set of individual behaviour tests, an adversarial simulation
tests an extreme version where a single input is queried many times with a search algorithm.
This is a deliberate exploitation of vulnerabilities as a worst-case scenario. As the adversary
is repeatedly querying the model a few small issues which may be fine when tested alone
can cause major prediction errors when combined in a sequence. Therefore an adversarial
simulation is needed to evaluate this specific worst-case scenario. Specific instances of mis-
takes can be identified with a tool like CheckList, but sporadic prediction failures would be
harder to detect. This sporadic behaviour may be exploited by adversaries that attempt
to alter model behaviour. A planned targeted attack such as this can further amplify the
vulnerability of an ML model. To help mitigate these threats the thesis presents methods
of performing evaluations that take a proactive approach to adversaries. By simulating an
adversary, a worse-case targeted attack against the classifier can be assessed. By spending
some more time during the initial development of the model, the long term technical debt
can be mitigated. CheckList is a good addition to the tests performed with this framework
for a more high-level reliability test in non-adversarial settings. Therefore the work in this
thesis complements CheckList by being a more detailed analysis on the individual behaviour
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of adversarial robustness in an environment involving a malicious actor.
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
The start date of adversarial machine learning is often stated as beginning around 2014.
With the popularity of deep learning models increasing, around this time computer vision
models were demonstrated to be susceptible to perturbed inputs. However, the manipulation
of inputs to classifiers has been happening long before the modern-day attacks on neural
networks [17]. From as early as 2004, researchers have demonstrated that carefully crafted
changes to the content in spam emails can manipulate linear classifiers [24]. Attackers would
substitute different words deemed as good or bad to subvert the decision of the model [59].
In a further advancement by the attackers, the message would instead be attached as an
image [15], which was counter measured by image-based hashing and by converting the
image back to text with Optical Character Recognition (OCR) tools [36]. To circumvent
this, attackers started adding noise to the images which were then countered with approaches
based on computer vision. The amount of image spam then reduced but adversaries are still
to this day, constantly adapting with new strategies [17]. As seen in the example of spam
detectors, the security of machine learning is an arms race. Over time the sophistication of
attacks has increased and alongside this has been increasingly complex countermeasures in
the form of automated classifiers [92].
There are two main forms of adversarial attacks: white box and black-box. White box
attacks involve having access to information about a classifier including the training data,
the features, the scoring function, the model weights and the hyperparameters [8]. Black-
box attacks do not require any of this information and are the approach our framework
supports. The only feedback required is the classifier score. Adversarial machine learning
can have one of two classification objectives: targeted or indiscriminate [8]. Targeted attacks
target a specific class whereas indiscriminate only has the constraint that the output class is
misclassified as another class. Our approach focuses on targeted attacks where the adversary
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has a specific goal (for example passing a phishing email through a filter). The goals of an
attacker can also be categorized into the main security violations: confidentiality, integrity
and availability [44].
A confidentiality attack targets privacy and aims to reveal information about a classifier
by crafting queries and receiving output scores [86]. A model inversion attack allows an
adversary to reconstruct training data used in training the classifier such as retrieving a
face from a computer vision classifier [35]. A model extraction attack attempts to build
a substitute model that behaves similarly to the model being attacked [45]. This type of
attack can enable an adversary to obtain a surrogate model that can be used in an offline
setting for generating adversarial examples [86].
An integrity attack is one in which the predictions made by the classifier cannot be
trusted. A distinction in integrity attack types is the source from which an adversary can
inject samples. The two options available are poisoning and evasion [57]. Poisoning involves
the ability to place adversarial examples in the training data that then becomes part of the
data distribution the model is trained on. Evasion attacks only have access to a model after
training has been complete. This thesis deals with evasion as our task is to cause mistakes
in classifiers that are already trained. In instances where the classifier is updated over time
on future iterations of data, some evasion samples may be part of future training, in part
achieving a poisoning attack. The integrity of the model is only compromised for adversarial
inputs, if every prediction made was useless this would be considered an availability attack.
An availability attack on a machine learning classifier would be an attack that disables
the ability of the classifier to make meaningful predictions. An example of such an attack
could be a denial of service attack that overloads a system, preventing it from responding to
any queries. A more sophisticated attack could be manipulating the model itself to provide
meaningless predictions for all inputs. An attacker could poison the training dataset to
ruin the data distribution and make effective training impossible [44]. This differs from an
integrity attack in that all inputs and not just a specially crafted subset are susceptible.
There are two high-level approaches to dealing with adversaries: a reactive approach
16
and a proactive approach. With a reactive approach, the designer of a classifier addresses
adversarial attacks only once the classifier has actually been attacked. The user then an-
alyzes the attack and devises a countermeasure. With a proactive approach, the classifier
designer will construct a threat model of an adversary, and then simulate attacks on their
classifier. They then implement defensive measures by analyzing the impact of the attack
and building countermeasures. Unlike the reactive scenario that involves a real adversary,
the proactive approach is handled entirely by the defender. The benefit of the proactive ap-
proach is being able to address insecurities before an actual compromise has occurred. The
work in this thesis takes a proactive approach by simulating attacks with a threat modelling
framework.
The underlying issue that enables adversarial examples to pose a threat to machine
learning classifiers is the lack of robustness [57]. When a text classifier is vulnerable to
adversarial examples this means that manipulated inputs can be crafted that change the
classifier prediction even when the modified text is nearly the same as the original. The
survey of Wang et al. shows that many related works have successfully demonstrated these
types of attacks against text classifiers [103].
Recent works have studied the behaviour of text classifiers in order to diagnose the cause
of these vulnerabilities [33]. It was found that model overfitting often leads to unrealistic
confidence estimates, resulting in seemingly random inputs having high probability scores for
NLP systems. This was tested by using input reduction that involves iteratively removing
a word from a document until the classification score changes greatly [33]. The authors
found that all of the relevant words can be removed while leaving seemingly random words.
To a human observer, the solutions end up as several nonsensical words unrelated to the
original document. These unstable results demonstrate the issues related to adversarial
robustness. While models can seem to perform well under normal circumstances, deliberate
manipulation can quickly impair performance.
Many NLP classifiers, including the models and attacks used in this thesis, make use
of word embeddings. Each word is converted into a high dimensional numeric vector using
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deep learning training algorithms. This representation of each word in a high dimensional
feature space allows for comparison between words. To study the relationships of words
in word embedding spaces, researchers have compared the stability of words for both their
word vector form and their semantic meaning. In general, word vectors closer in the vector
space are supposed to be more similar than those further away, but this is often not the case.
It has been found that vectors close in proximity can often have very different semantics [88].
This property can be exploited by attackers to produce inputs that appear similar to the
classifier but have clear semantic differences to a person. Document manipulation types can
be divided into two main groups: character-level and word-level. Character-level attacks
perform perturbations on individual characters within a word. Basic examples include
attacks that use insertion, deletion, swapping, and substitution [54]. More advanced versions
can use rare characters such as from other languages that are visually similar to the original
character [31]. Word-level attacks involve modifications at the level of entire words, most
often replacing it with a semantically similar one. This thesis is based on a word swapping
genetic algorithm that does swaps using word embeddings [9].
2.3 Measuring Text Quality
To study the differences between adversarial documents and their original versions, auto-
mated metrics developed for machine translation can be used. Given a source language docu-
ment, the evaluation involves measuring the similarity of the target language prediction with
a ground truth label. A widely used metric, the BLEU score [75] is an n-gram based met-
ric. It does exact word-level matches and therefore does not detect morphological changes
or synonyms. A more recent metric, METEOR [27] uses stemming, synonym lookups and
other paraphrasing techniques to generalize better. This however needs language-specific
training, limiting the approach to certain trained languages. chrF is a metric that operates
on a sub-word level. This provides more generalized detection of morphological variations
without language-specific training [80]. Another option is to convert the documents into
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another representation and find the distance between the overall documents. One popular
option is sentence encoders that are used to convert each document into a vector representa-
tion [21]. A distance metric such as the cosine distance is then used to measure the similarity
of the vectors. While these automated metrics may be adequate for basic estimates, they
are only a rough approximation of semantic similarity between documents and less suitable
for detailed quality comparisons. For these reasons, fine-tuned similarity distinctions often
still need to be made by people. In addition, regardless of the automated methods used,
these similarity metrics are not able to tell us how suspicious a modified document may
appear to a reader.
To address the suspicion of text, automated methods such as classifiers or grammar
checkers have been proposed. Automated grammar checking tools are one of the simplest
ways of identifying suspicious text. Open source grammar checking tools such as Language-
Tool [73] can be used that is composed of thousands of human-curated rules that can be
used to grade a document. Tools such as this can be used to produce a list of grammatical
errors which can indicate an overall quality level. This however may not pick up subtle
writing irregularities or obvious context-dependent clues such as information unrelated to
the rest of the document. Another limitation is defining thresholds. It is assumed that a
machine-made text would have more grammatical errors than a person. However as both
produce at least some errors, the challenge is deciding what threshold to use.
An alternative option that would provide a more complete end to end solution is training
a classifier to identify the difference between human versus machine-made documents. This
can be done using the same text generation models that produce realistic machine-made text.
While these models are often highly effective at identifying the machine-made texts [108],
it has been found that less noticeable alterations can be hard to detect [104]. In situations
where the text is a modified version of a legitimate human text, the effectiveness also
diminishes [90]. This is a significant limitation for the majority of adversarial attacks as
most attacks edit existing documents [103]. Another issue is the large datasets needed to
train the models. In scenarios with a smaller dataset, this approach may not work as well.
19
As another consideration, there is no guarantee that identified adversaries correlate with the
perceived suspicion from a human reviewer. This does not also test whether key information
(such as named entities) are preserved. For this, we need the input of human reviewers using
a human participants study.
All of these related works demonstrate that automatic metrics can have some success
but are overall less reliable than human reviewers. The approach used in this thesis advocates
for the use of human reviewers for the most reliable ratings. In situations with less stringent
quality control, these automated metrics can be used in place of the tests run in the human
participants study. This enables our method to be used with a wide variety of evaluation
budgets.
2.4 Evaluating Model Robustness
When evaluating the performance of adversarial attacks, the majority of works focus the
evaluation entirely on the percentage of inputs that fool the model [103]. To address the
quality of the text, a single static constraint is set for the attack such as only returning the
top ten nearest neighbours per word and a fixed language model threshold. This however
does not provide insight into the actual perception of people and does not identify cases of
subtle semantic impairment. The inconsistency of quality control also impairs the ability to
reproduce the attack results. The survey of Zhang et al. shows that human evaluations are
rarely considered as the main focus, as most works only measure attack performance [109].
When human studies are used, they only test on a small sample of people just to check
whether the text quality is sufficient. They do so as a confirmation for a particular test and
not for comparison or analysis purposes.
There are a few related works that have proposed evaluation frameworks for adversarial
NLP models. The TEAPOT tool is an evaluation framework used to measure the success
of machine translation in adversarial settings [65]. The evaluation involves two sets of
documents: the source language document with its adversarial version and the predicted
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translation for both the original and adversarial version. The attack is considered a success
when the difference between the predicted translations is greater than the perturbation made
to the input. This can be translated into classification converting the similarity metric into a
binary classification metric of either failing or succeeding in fooling the model. This however
reduces the fine-grained ability to compare perturbation amounts, limiting its effectiveness
in measuring quality.
TextAttack [72] is a framework for adversarial attacks, data augmentation and adver-
sarial training. It is a Python tool that implements popular adversarial attack algorithms as
well as popular datasets and classifiers from the HuggingFace Library [105]. It also provides
an interface for applying constraints to the attack process, such as the automated text qual-
ity metrics discussed above. This makes TextAttack a good option for users to benchmark
their attacks against others and generate adversarial text for data augmentation. What is
missing, however, is a methodology for assisting users in the decision making process of how
to fine-tune the constraints and choosing which exact thresholds to set.
TextAttack does not assist the user in evaluating the trade-offs associated with either
increasing or decreasing the constraints and the effect this has on the attack process. Since
these works do not evaluate or consider alternative constraint levels, this may result in a non-
optimal constraint being applied. In this thesis, I advocate for a proactive testing approach.
Rather than simply choosing a single constraint level and then performing a small human
participant test, I propose a system for larger-scale tests on many different sample groups
to provide a more informed decision-making process. Instead of validating a chosen attack
afterwards to simply check if the text quality is merely adequate, the approach optimizes
for efficiency and quality beforehand. This thesis presents a formal threat modelling system
for converting benchmarks into insights that can be acted upon.
By having a thorough approach for trade-off evaluation, a user can combine the com-
putational cost of running an attack with the human participant results to allow for direct
comparison between multiple constraint levels. While TextAttack and the attack approaches
it implements provide a system for benchmarking attack options and constraints, they only
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test each factor independently and do not have any method of combining findings into a
unified way of making consistent decision making. The contribution in this thesis, therefore,
is not just the results themselves but the methodology for generating and then comparing
results. By extending the constraint systems for fine-tuned constraint control and trade-off
evaluation, the framework proposed in this thesis complements TextAttack by providing a
more thorough methodology to go with the implementation of the attacks.
To defend against attacks, some works have found methods for improved adversarial
robustness but at the cost of reduced performance when the input is not adversarial [103].
During the training process, approaches have been proposed that can guarantee a degree
of resilience to certain attacks [46]. Improved accuracy on adversarial examples comes
with at least some performance hit on the accuracy for non-adversarial inputs. Without
considering the percentage of inputs that are adversarial, we are performing an evaluation
without the necessary context, making it hard to determine when the performance decrease
is worthwhile.
The proposed framework in this thesis can evaluate adversarial training using a cus-
tomized set of assumptions including the percentage of adversaries which can help inform
which robustness guarantees are most important. This can be used with any defence method
and combined with constraint levels and their impact on attack efficiency and text quality.
In addition, the framework provides demonstrations of various constraint levels and justifi-
cation for choosing each constraint, rather than setting a single constraint level and only a
basic accuracy test as is most common [103]. This lets a user choose an optimal approach
amongst many constraint alternatives rather than settling with a compromise that is not
worthwhile.
2.5 Visual Analytics and Interpretability
The increasing complexity of classifiers has resulted in a lot of attention on creating methods
of better explaining machine learning systems [69]. Machine learning interpretability is an
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important goal for many machine learning practitioners [29]. It has become a popular
research topic with initiatives such as Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) [25] that
have the objective of exploring methods for increasing transparency in AI systems. When
dealing with black-box models there are two categories of approaches that can be used to
provide interpretability: model specific and model agnostic [70]. Model specific methods
only work for a specific type of machine learning model. For example a visualization of the
trees in a random forest [10] or the hidden layers of a neural network [96] are approaches
that can only work for those specific model types. Model agnostic approaches can be applied
to any machine learning model. They treat the classifier as a black-box and only require an
output score from the model to operate. The approach used in this thesis is model-agnostic
to allow for greater applicability of the framework. This means that the visual analytics
dashboard can be used to make adjustments for any attack algorithm and NLP domain.
Interpretability for a model can also be defined as a global or local process [70]. A global
explanation would provide details of how the system works as a whole to generate all of the
results. Local scope explanations provide context to specific subsets or individual instances
of the dataset such as LIME [84]. An NLP specific example is using a leave one out approach
where each word is removed, one at a time to compare the differences in classification [55].
Other examples use nearest neighbours of the text such as by using a conformity score to
determine explanation in the local region [101]. The framework uses local explanations at
the document level. This means that the reasoning for classification is explained using the
words in that particular document. This is done by assessing the impact of specific words
in the document with the surrounding context taken into consideration.
Another method of generating explanations is through counterfactuals that provide an
example of what changes are required to switch the classification [68]. Adversarial examples
closely resemble this as the output of the attack algorithm is an example that is as close to
the original as possible while changing the score. These types of explanations can be used
to help diagnose the behaviour of the model being attacked.
Visual analytics systems have been designed to help users examine machine learning
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classifiers to help improve classifier performance through methods such as explanatory de-
bugging [51]. Providing explanations for classifier errors has been found to improve trust
in the predictions made by the model [30]. The framework proposed in this thesis employs
similar techniques by explaining behaviour with scores built from embedding distances and
language models. In this thesis, the debugging objective is explaining the semantic and
score impacts of adversarial examples.
To explain model overfitting, feature heat maps have been built that colour encodes
words based on their importance to the classifier score [33]. Other works have visualized
partial dependence plots [49] and provided instance-level explanations [98]. In order to
more easily find word replacements, the dashboard uses scatterplots to explore the word
embedding space. Related works that have explored embedding spaces include a tool for
concept building [76] and a tool for comparing word embedding relationships [39].
Researchers have also studied the use of interactive visualizations for the explanation
of machine learning models [58]. Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a popular
technique to build computer vision adversaries. Visualizations for GANs include tools to
educate users about internal mechanisms and training procedures [47] as well as a tool to
evaluate GAN results [102]. However, visual analytics work specifically focused on adversar-
ial attacks are limited. Related work pertaining to the visualization of adversarial attacks
is Adversarial Playground [74], which specifically works with white box attacks for com-
puter vision. The work in this thesis differs by operating in the discrete domain of NLP
using black-box and model agnostic approaches for a more flexible approach. This thesis
introduces the first usage of visual analytics for the exploration of adversaries using NLP
classification [103].
With improved model understanding, weaknesses between classifiers can be more easily
compared. This can be done using exploratory data analysis that can observe the statistical
properties of the data to find overall trends to help spot anomalies. However, it has been
found that visualizations are not being used by the majority of data scientists when assessing
security risks. In surveys conducted with data scientists, it was found that visualization is
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only used as a tool to communicate end results with others and is not used for the analysis
of the data itself [13]. This demonstrates that although there has been research in using
visualization for ML research [60], a large gap exists between data science and visualization.
Some of the reasons for this gap include challenges interoperability with other tools and
only working with specific datasets and data formats [89]. To help address these limitations,
the framework in this thesis is designed with flexibility requirements discussed in the next
chapter.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the background knowledge and works related to adver-
sarial machine learning for NLP classification. We started by introducing Machine Learning
Operations (MLOps) and how quality assurance concepts from software engineering can
play a part in the development life cycle of a classifier. While concepts such as unit testing
can be applied to machine learning classifiers, the unique challenges of ML evaluation make
direct application of these methods intractable. Tools such as CheckList [85] can test against
input changes, however, it only tests individual changes and not a deliberate, worse-case
attack scenario. For this, we need to consider specifically the domain of adversarial attack
simulation.
Next, we discussed the history of adversarial machine learning for NLP including the
spam arms race and the different categorizations of attacks based on the objectives of con-
fidentiality, availability and integrity. We also discussed the differences between a reactive
and proactive security approach. Next NLP specific attacks were discussed including the
different ways that black-box attack algorithms can manipulate documents as part of an
attack.
Methods of evaluating the quality of adversarial text is also an important area for this
thesis. I mentioned many options for the automated evaluation of documents. Machine
translation metrics can be used to score the difference between documents with methods
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including BLEU [75], METEOR [27], and chrF [80], but they do not judge the overall
quality of the text such as grammar issues. Tools such as LangaugeTool [73] can check for
quality control but we need to define quality thresholds. To identify artificially made text we
can train classifiers, however, they may not pick up subtle writing irregularities or obvious
context-dependent clues. All of these related works demonstrate that automatic metrics can
have some success but are overall less reliable than human reviewers. This is why we use
human participants for the evaluation in this thesis.
Next, we covered the evaluation of adversarial robustness and the frameworks that
currently exist for NLP. The majority of related works conduct robustness evaluation with
little thought to the quality of the adversarial output. Most often only a single quality
constraint is tested with no trade-off evaluations done. TEAPOT [65] provides a way to
measure adversaries for machine translation and while this could be used for classification,
it would not be as precise. TextAttack [72] is a framework for data augmentation and
adversarial training that implements many attack strategies and constraint methods found
in related works. This approach however does not provide any direction for users to evaluate
trade-offs to choose which exact thresholds to set. This thesis complements TextAttack by
providing a thorough methodology to go with their implementation of the attacks.
Lastly, we discussed visualization tools that can improve the interpretability of machine
learning models. We discussed how interpretability methods can be model-specific or model
agnostic and how classifier explanations can be global or local. Visual analytics can help
improve model debugging and help a user place greater trust into models, including ways to
explain model over-fitting which can help a user learn more about adversarial robustness.
There have been few works for robustness visualization, and this thesis presents the first
use of visual analytics for the robustness evaluation of NLP classifiers.
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3 A Framework for the Robustness Evaluation of NLP
Classifiers
As discussed in the literature review chapter, there has been a lot of research on developing
attacks, but there has been much less work on the evaluation and defence of adversarial
text examples [109]. These works are only just beginning to properly address this challenge,
only accomplishing a small amount of the necessary work for a thorough evaluation of
text classifier robustness. The lack of depth of these approaches limits their usefulness for
extracting actionable intelligence for real-world deployment of text classifiers.
There are also a large number of challenges with evaluating the robustness of a classifier
[16]. There are many factors that need to be considered beyond just using an accuracy
score. When a measure such as accuracy becomes a target for benchmarks, it can lose its
importance as a good measure. Defences optimizing purely on an accuracy metric would
not be considering other important factors. When a model is optimizing a single metric
it is likely to achieve a sub-optimal result overall [99]. When taking into account attack
efficiency and text quality, the optimal value for accuracy may greatly degrade these other
metrics. In the case of adversarial machine learning, an attacker focusing entirely on the
number of adversaries built is ignoring the computational cost of running the attack. An
attack may appear to have improved attack success rate only because the text has changed
so much that the model should actually change the prediction made.
Improving the way in which NLP models are evaluated can provide for a consistent
decision-making approach within an organization. This can improve communication and
help various development teams to work together to share their work more easily. Being
able to more clearly exchange ideas on successful strategies and issues currently being faced
can help encourage increased collaboration amongst teams. Additionally, with improved
communication channels, this could have the potential to increase senior buy-in from key
decision-makers in an organization, one of the largest challenges for data scientists trying
to get a model into production [7]. Even though you need to run multiple tests to get an
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answer, the extra insight you get from this can be worth it. Identifying opportunity costs
associated with various threat models can help select the best strategy for an organization.
This can account for the nuances of particular datasets so that the optimal classifier and
attacker constraints are selected.
A flexible, customizable and transparent framework to evaluate the robustness of NLP
classifiers is needed to ensure a consistent and reproducible way of simulating adversarial
environments. This thesis proposes a framework that addresses these issues. The framework
is comprised of the machine learning models we are training, the attack algorithms, and the
threat model made from word embeddings and a language model. The server attacks the
target classifier using an attack configuration chosen by the user. The components are
designed in a modular way so that the attack algorithm, the threat model, or the classifier
can be easily swapped. This provides flexibility by having an extensible set of components
for expanded framework ability. The defence system implements any adversarial robustness
technique a user wishes to test. Any black-box defence technique can be implemented which
needs only a label or numerical score from the classifier when queried. In this thesis, a new
iterative adversarial training approach is evaluated as a remodel defence technique as we
will show in Chapter 6. All components are assumed to be under the control of the user
in a proactive defence setting but may also be an external classifier that is being assessed.
This means that the user must have complete control over all aspects of the environment
including the model, the attack algorithm, the countermeasures and the data.
This framework is meant to be used by a defender to protect against malicious actors.
While this is the intended goal, as with most cybersecurity offerings, there is the potential
for an attacker to take advantage of this. This means the framework could be used in
both an offensive and defensive way depending on the objectives of the user. If the user
is a malicious actor wishing to attack a classifier, they would wish to find the best attack
settings and constraints that optimize for the best balance of maximizing the number of
successful adversarial examples while ensuring sufficient text quality [109]. If the user is the
owner of a classifier they would be using the framework in a proactive way to improve their
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defence by identifying the optimal attack strategy in the same way as the attacker, but then
using this to craft better countermeasures.
The adversary is likely to try and adapt to the changes made by the defender, which
means that this framework may need to operate iteratively with adaptations made over
time. It should not be assumed that applying the processes in this framework guarantees
security. There is always the possibility of compromise, and this framework is just a way
to mitigate the risks as much as is feasible, given the use case of the model owner. For
some time, an equilibrium may be reached between the attacker and defender capabilities.
Still, such stability is unlikely to last in the long term as technologies evolve to enhance
offensive or defensive approaches. A constantly changing attack surface highlights the need
for security frameworks for routine security audits using the process in this thesis.
3.1 Requirements
In order to have a machine learning classifier become successfully deployed, any supporting
framework must address several important requirements. The framework must be very
flexible by being black-box and model-agnostic. The framework must be highly customizable
so that we can test a wide variety of constraint levels with the threat modelling system. The
framework must also assist the user in comparing constraint levels as well as assessing the
trade-offs of different classifiers and attack settings. Lastly, the framework must include
interpretability tools to aid in understanding the overall threat modelling process. Here
I describe in more detail these high-level requirements that the framework is designed to
address.
3.1.1 Flexibility
In order to support a wide variety of environments and use cases, flexibility is a central
design requirement. To support a flexible approach, the framework is model-agnostic and
supports any black-box attack. All parts of the architecture are delivered as a black-box
where the user does not need to know the underlying details of any component used as they
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are abstracted into the service. Model-agnostic systems are important as they provide a
wide range of model flexibility [83]. Model flexibility means that the system must be able
to work with any machine learning algorithm and this ensures that our attack algorithm
will work against any type of classifier. As an example, whether the target classifier being
attacked is a rule-based system, a neural network or any other classifier the attack will work
in the same way. The only requirement from the classifier being attacked is that the assigned
class needs to come with a numerical score.
Representation flexibility is also an important feature for a system to have [83]. Rep-
resentation flexibility means that the system supports many explanation methods. Having
different explanations can help the user adjust to different objectives and domains. The
framework supports such flexibility by allowing the user to easily switch in different threat
models, attack algorithms, defence strategies and interpretation tools. Regardless of the un-
derlying feature representation being used by the model under attack, we can still represent
the documents with feature importance as words in the visual analytics dashboard.
This framework is also attack-agnostic. This means that we can use any perturbation
method we wish. An attack agnostic framework makes comparing and switching between
options easier. Any model and attack strategy can be swapped in as needed, making com-
parison evaluations using the framework easy to test. With flexibility as a central design
principle, the framework is extensible, allowing quick replacement of any components. Re-
gardless of the choices made, the framework can enable a consistent assessment methodology.
3.1.2 Highly Customized
In order to successfully mitigate the attack surface of potential threats, one must test a wide
variety of threats. This means that the user must have complete control over all aspects of
the environment including the model, the attack algorithm, defence strategies, and the data.
For this reason, the framework is designed to be highly customized. Being very adaptable
is also important for allowing the user to define a tailored threat model by testing different
constraints on the attack algorithm.
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For the attack process in this thesis, we use word substitutions based on word embed-
dings as this allows for finer tuned control of the document. By operating on a word level
we have a high level of control over the allowed perturbations. Using word embeddings and
a language model, we can specify exact similarity distances and language model thresholds.
(This process is detailed further in Section 4.2). These are not the only possibilities for the
attack and constraints. As flexibility is one of our other requirements, we can also customize
these choices to any that only need the classifier score.
3.1.3 User Guidance
This framework involves many performance evaluations. Between performance assessments
on attack efficiency and subjective human study results, there are many factors to consider
when choosing between which attacks to run and threat models to use. In addition to
combining all of the different metrics, the user needs to take into account the priorities
of the specific use case environment. Different use case environments mean that machine
learning administrators may have different assumptions about the quality constraints used
and available resources of an adversary.
In order to convert all of these tests and priorities into actionable intelligence, a user
needs to combine all the metrics into a final decision. With many different options to choose
from it can be useful to apply a clear and consistent set of rules for evaluating every option.
The framework must assist users in making trade-off assessments between the accuracy
performance of the models and the semantic quality of the adversarial documents. To help
with this, the framework introduces formulas to combine the results of all the tests and user
priorities into a simplified score for easier comparison between approaches. The formulas
provide a consistent methodology to apply that takes into consideration the priorities of
the user. This can enable the user to experiment with different settings to find the most
appropriate threat model and training parameters. With a guided framework, the user is
able to emulate many different threat models and assess the trade-offs before choosing a
deployment that best suits their specific needs.
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3.1.4 Interpretability
Increased transparency into the behaviour of machine learning classifiers can provide many
benefits including increased user acceptance of the predictions made [30]. Currently, models
are not very trusted for increased business transparency but it is predicted that by 2022, over
30% of organizations will use explainable AI to help improve trust with stakeholders [42].
To reach these levels of adoption and to place even greater trust in automated systems,
more clearly defined systematic evaluations of ML models will be needed. In this thesis,
increased transparency is desired to improve the understanding of the model behaviour [51].
By providing greater interpretability, the user can better diagnose and learn more about the
vulnerabilities against adversarial examples.
To address the requirements above, we have designed a flexible, customizable and trans-
parent framework to evaluate the robustness of NLP classifiers. The framework should also
include visualizations to allow users to assess the impact of the adversarial attacks on the
documents. This can enable the user to experiment with different settings to find the most
appropriate threat model and training parameters. Users can experiment with different
inputs and observe how the model output differs from their expected behaviour. The use of
visual analytics can assist users in exploring the attack search space, the feature importance
of each word in a document, and how the behaviour of a model can change after robustness
strategies are used.
3.2 Framework Design
A diagram of the framework can be seen in Figure 3.1 which presents all of the components
in a high-level abstracted view. This presents a map of all the important aspects of the work
in this thesis, with each coloured block representing a major contribution to the framework.
As seen on the left and starting from the top, there are four main steps involved with the
framework. In the first step, the user defines the threat model used to simulate the adversary.
This is comprised of the attack algorithm as well as a set of constraints applied to the attack
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Figure 3.1: Overview of all significant framework components. (1) The process begins with the
user defining constraint levels to test using the threat modelling system. (2) Next, the user
runs the attack algorithm and performs evaluations that measure the attack performance and
performs a human participants study. (3) Next, the user can compare threat model results with a
set of equations and lastly, (4) they can test defence methods to improve robustness. The visual
analytics block is adjacent to all the other four steps to represent how it can be used alongside all
the different parts for increased interpretability as the user progresses through the framework’s
stages.
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algorithm. The classifier, also known as the NLP model, is connected to the system for
providing predictions. The terms adversarial example, input, text or document are used
interchangeably throughout the thesis to represent what the NLP model will be classifying.
This is a record from the dataset that is perturbed using the attack algorithm until the
NLP model has been fooled. The next step of the framework is the evaluation methods.
This is divided into two main categories: attack evaluation, and a human participants
study. The next step is to compare threat model constraints to find the optimal approach
for the user’s scenario. Lastly, the user can test defence approaches. A demonstration of
a defence evaluation is presented in Chapter 6. Visualization is another core component
of the framework, to increase understanding of the evaluation process and the results for
the user. This contains interpretability tools used to better understand the classifiers, the
attacker and the defender. Using interactive visualizations and linked graphs, the dashboard
enables the user to display the results of the adversarial simulation runs. Section 7 discusses
general use cases of visualizations prior to adversarial testing and sections 8.2 and 8.4 discuss
visualizations designed specifically for the attacker and defender analysis respectively.
3.2.1 System Architecture
To evaluate the framework, an architecture was designed as a combination of a client-facing
web dashboard and an adversarial simulation system on the back-end. This architecture
design was chosen to easily facilitate communications between the end client and the attack
server. The adversarial attack algorithm can be run on a central server that can deliver the
results to a web browser on any device. The web browser enables an interactive visualization
dashboard to present the results of the service to the user. The service interface translates
user interactions into requests to the back-end server that performs the adversarial simu-
lation. The architecture enables the delivery of the service as a black box where the user
does not need to know the underlying details of the machine learning algorithms applied as
they are abstracted into the service. In this way, the service can be model-agnostic where
different machine learning algorithms can be applied. This allows for greater flexibility
34
when using the tool as the user can swap algorithms as the need arises. A diagram of the
architecture can be seen in Figure 3.2. A lower-level technical description and diagram of
the implementation can be found in Appendix A.
3.3 Threat Model
There are a wide variety of motivations for malicious actors to perform an attack. Profit-
seeking cybercriminals, geopolitical threats from nation-states, discontent from insiders or
even just thrill-seekers looking for satisfaction are just some of the possible rationales for
cyberattacks [19]. This means that the strength and sophistication of attacks can vary
greatly and that a single threat model would be insufficient for all organizations. This means
that one needs a customizable approach that enables an organization to make assumptions
about the capabilities of an adversary. Here I introduce the threat modelling system used
to simulate the behaviour of the adversary. This is done by defining the goal, knowledge
and capabilities of the adversary. I also describe the process used for controlling the quality
of the documents during the adversarial generation process.
3.3.1 Threat Model Definition
The goal of the adversary is a targeted evasion attack. As described in the background
chapter, this means that we wish to perform an attack on documents of one specific class
and fool the model into classifying the documents as a different chosen class. For the datasets
used in this thesis, the attacker is converting negative movie reviews or toxic comments into
a positive movie review or non-toxic comment. There is more to a successful attack, however,
than just fooling the classifier. The adversarial document must successfully convince the
user that the text is legitimate while also preserving the information in the text. The goal
can be thought of as attempting to pass through two filters: the classifier and the person.
The first filter is to fool the NLP model into making the wrong prediction on the input. The
second filter is convincing people who are reading the document. This concept is depicted
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Figure 3.2: System Architecture. The user interacts with the system using a visual analytics
dashboard. The attack server contains the attack algorithm, configured with a search method,
attack parameters, and constraint levels. The constraint levels are defined with word embeddings
and a language model. The attack algorithm attacks documents from the dataset by repeatedly
querying the target classifier, which returns prediction scores.
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version of the document (0). This is the baseline document before any manipulation by
an adversary has taken place. The first adversarial example “This movie was awful” (1)
is predicted as a negative movie review. As the goal of the adversary is to change the
prediction to a positive review, this is considered a failure in fooling the model. The next
three documents demonstrate examples that succeed in fooling the model but are unable
to pass the second filter as they fail to convince the person. The example “This movie was
good” (2) fails because the observed class was changed. The reason it passes the model
is because the class of the document is a positive review, meaning the classifier made the
correct prediction. As the objective of the attacker is to keep the same sentiment this would
be considered a failure as the person is now seeing a document of the wrong class. The next
document “This comedy was bad” (3) fails because the content has been changed. This
means that even though a user may not be suspicious, and the class is still preserved, the
information in the message was altered. In any case where the movie was not a comedy the
document will not make sense and be rejected by the person. The next document “This
movie where bad” (4) is unconvincing as it does not make proper sense. As the grammar
has been perturbed too greatly, the text would be deemed suspicious and rejected by the
person. Lastly, the final document “This movie wasn’t good” (5) passes both filters as
follows. The machine classifies the document as positive (for example, due to a weakness in
handling negations). Thus the document passes the negation filter. The person accepts the
document as legitimate since the grammar is adequate and the meaning has not changed,
thus achieving the adversarial goal.
The knowledge of the attacker is black-box meaning they only have access to an output
score from the model. It is important to note however that the attacker may have some
idea as to what features are being used by the classifier. Since this is an NLP classifier it
is assumed an attacker would understand that the words in the document are an important
factor. By changing the words, the attacker could be expected to alter the decision of the
model. The attacker would not know, however, what transformations are done to the words




(0) This movie was bad.
(1) This movie was awful.
(2) This movie was good.





Figure 3.3: The multi-objective goal of an adversary. The first objective is to fool the NLP model
into making the incorrect prediction. The second objective is to convince the person by preserving
the true class, being grammatically correct and keeping the same meaning. The first document
(0) is the original before manipulation. Adversarial variants: (1) fails to fool the model because
it is classified as negative, (2) convinces the model that it is positive, but fails to convince the
user because the class was not preserved as the document appears positive, (3) fails to convince
the user because the meaning has changed, (4) fails to convince the user as the grammar was
poor, (5) successfully convinces both the model and the person.
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know about other features such as metadata and other feature engineering techniques being
used. Therefore as knowledge of the model is considered very limited, the attack is described
as a black-box.
The capabilities of the adversary describe in what ways the attacker can manipulate
the document in order to fool the classifier. In this thesis, the type of attack being run
is a word swap approach. In the extreme case, the strongest capabilities would be for the
attacker to try and manipulate the document in any way. Any sort of word swap would
be permitted if it meant the classifier could be fooled, even random text with no meaning.
This however would not achieve the adversary’s goal of also convincing a person. For this
reason, the attacker is likely to place some sort of constraints on the attack process. This
means that the capabilities are dependant on the goals of the attacker. While an attacker
could swap words with anything in order to fool the classifier, they are likely to apply some
sort of quality control to convince the person reading the document. For example, if an
adversary was trying to send spam or phishing emails they would only need to convince
the one person reading the email. Quality would therefore be less of an issue. Compare
this with a private social media group that is heavily moderated, documents of poor quality
would get rejected quickly. Therefore what the attacker is capable of is limited based on
what the attack is being used for. To account for a wide variety of testing environments the
threat model must be tailored to match the appropriate quality level. Attacking at a word
level provides granularity for fine-tuned adjustment, allowing the attack to adjust exactly
how much manipulation is permitted. The attacker can choose which individual words they
want to change and easily manage the quality for applying constraints that permit or deny
each word swap. To model this behaviour, we define constraints that are applied to the
attack process in order to control the quality of the documents. This process of controlling
the quality of the text is described next.
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3.3.2 Quality Control
When generating adversarial texts there are many factors to consider that impact the quality
of the resulting examples. These constraints can be described as the attacker’s action space
and describe the set of constraints the adversarial examples must meet. These constraint
definitions are an extension of Gilmer et al. [37] that I have extended for the context of
adversarial NLP. They are some of the considerations needed when defining how an attack
should operate. The following is the list of some important factors to consider when defining
an adversarial text attack:
• Content-preserving: The text must preserve the content of the message. For exam-
ple, if the text is about a particular named entity, it must still be about that entity.
• Semantic-preserving: The attacker may make any perturbation to the example
they want, as long as the meaning is preserved.
• Syntax-preserving: The grammatical elements of the text should maintain proper
form, the overall structure of the writing should remain unchanged from the perspec-
tive of the recipient.
• Suspicion: To what extent the text appears to be purposely manipulated. An exam-
ple would be replacing characters with alternative symbols.
• Legibility: The text is in a form that can be easily seen as words by humans. For
example, visually perturbing text such as through captcha techniques would degrade
legibility.
• Readability: The text can still be easily understood by a human. For example,
replacing text with words beyond the average person’s lexicon would degrade read-
ability.
The extent to which an attack matches the above criteria is often a subjective question
and therefore is likely to be placed somewhere on a spectrum for each of these aspects.
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For example, spelling errors or poor grammar might increase suspicion but how much is
uncertain as these could be considered legitimate human-made mistakes. Changes could
also impair syntax, semantics or readability. Depending on the importance of the various
constraints, different attack strategies need to be implemented. We convert the qualitative
factors discussed above into quantitative constraints. This is done through the customized
filtering thresholds applied against the attack algorithm. The threat models and their
evaluation in the next chapter are designed to account for different combinations of these
constraints. The threat model has two main components to evaluate this: a language model
and word embeddings.
Word embeddings are vector representations of each word in the vocabulary. We use
the Python library Gensim [81] to calculate the similarity between the word embeddings.
The scores represent the similarity of the words and are in the range of [0-1]. A greater
score indicates a stronger relationship between the words. The user selects a threshold that
defines the lowest similarity score that is permitted. The similarity score of the candidate
word must surpass this threshold to pass the filter. This helps to select swaps that are
synonyms to the original word to retain the original meaning.
The language model provides a check on the overall semantic context of the word swaps.
The language model offers a large context window enabling more semantically appropriate
scoring. This means that the swapped word is scored along with all the other words in
the context window. A log-likelihood score is obtained for each word which is then added
together for a final score. This means that unlike the word embeddings that have a word-level
scope, the language model operates at sentence-level. First, the language model scores the
sentence with the original word in it. Then this word is swapped for each candidate word and
these new sentences are scored, providing a score for each candidate word. The difference
in the log-likelihood is then returned as the language model score, with a greater score
indicating a larger difference in meaning between the candidate and the original word. The
user selects a threshold that defines the maximum gap between the original and candidate
word scores that will be permitted. Words must be below this threshold in order to pass
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the filter.
Together both the word embeddings and language model constraints work to ensure
the quality of the adversarial text is not degraded. Adjusting these thresholds changes the
number of words that pass the filters, resulting in a varying number of swap candidates. This
either increases or decreases the overall attack search space for the algorithm. Reducing the
search space helps ensure that examples produced are realistic examples where the level of
realism is dependant on how high the constraints are set. The trade-off with a smaller search
space is less opportunity for an attack algorithm to find a word swap that is effective at
fooling the classifier. Therefore, by adjusting the threat model constraints we can evaluate
the trade-offs between text quality and attack success rate across various levels of threat
model constraints.
An example of this trade-off is depicted in Figure 3.4. In the first example, the con-
straint level is too low. The attack search space is very large and this results in most
documents making it past the NLP model but very few manage to convince a person. The
attacker in this case has sent the user too many poor-quality documents. Not only are these
rejected by the user which wastes the computation time of the adversary, but the flood
of documents may also raise suspicion of attack by the document recipient. In the second
example, the constraint levels are too high. Even though the quality is adequate to convince
the user in most cases, the small search space means very few documents are able to fool
the model. In this case, the constraints need to be loosened so that more examples can get
past the model. In the last example, the constraint levels are set just right. This is the
perfect balance between fooling the model and fooling the person, resulting in the maximum
amount of successful attacks. To properly evaluate the trade-off of convincing the model
versus a person we need to be able to measure the impact the constraints have on each
filter. To do this we need to run the attack on different levels of constraints and measure
the success on both the classifier and people. The first task, convincing the model is easy
to measure, we can look at the attack success rate and computation cost to determine the
attack efficiency. The second step, convincing the person is more difficult to evaluate. To
42
Constraints Too Low Constraints Too High Constraints Just Right
Figure 3.4: The trade-off between convincing the machine versus convincing a person. Left: Many
documents can fool the classifier but the person is not convinced by most of them. This means
the attacker wasted many documents that could raise suspicion with a flood of poor documents.
Center: In this case, the quality was high enough for the person to have been convinced by most
documents. However, raising the quality greatly reduced the search space of examples that can
fool the model. This means the constraints were too high as most were blocked at the model.
Right: The optimal balance of documents convincing both machine and person. The constraints
were set at a level that provides the highest number of documents to pass both filters.
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approximate the response from people we ran a human participants test which is described
in section 4.3. Our human subjects study was designed to measure the impact of preserving
the class label, the grammar quality and the similarity of the adversarial document to the
original. The end objective for a user of the framework is to run several versions of the
threat model by adjusting the constraint levels to find the optimal constraints to apply.
The user can import both a language model and word embeddings of their choice. For
our word embeddings we have chosen to use the word2vec embedding from the Google News
corpus [66] and the language model is a language model [40] that was adapted for semantic
queries [46]. The size of the context window is 6, the same as the original source [46].
These scores are precomputed for a more efficient attack process, also done in the original
implementation [46]. To summarize, the following are the two types of constraints applied
to the attack algorithm:
1. Embedding Similarity Score: A score representing the similarity of words in a word
embedding space. Smaller scores are worse.
2. Language Model Score: The difference in the log-likelihood score between the original
sentence and one with a swapped word. Larger scores are worse.
3.4 Attack Algorithm
The attacks are implemented as a genetic algorithm that emulates the process of natural
selection and is based on an existing word swapping attack [9]. That work used the GloVe
word embeddings [79] and the language model was the Google 1 billion words model [22]. For
improved scalability, the work in this thesis has instead used the embeddings and language
model discussed in the previous section. We have chosen this attack strategy since it is not
reliant on gradients. This means it operates as a black-box attack that works regardless of
the model, its parameters, or the data set. This enables us to achieve our requirement of
flexibility. The attack works by iteratively building stronger adversarial texts over a set of
generations. Each generation involves the evolution of a population pool through crossover
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from parent reproduction and mutations of the text. The entire procedure can be seen in
Algorithm 1.
The process starts with pre-processing the document. The required steps would be
different between datasets, but for the datasets used in this thesis this included stripping
HTML elements and removing special or accent characters. The text is also tokenized
into a list separating the text into a set of words (line 1). Once the document has been
preprocessed, the neighbour lists for each word are populated by getting the neighbours
(synonyms) based on the word embedding source chosen by the user (line 3). Up to a
maximum of ten words are included, the same as the original implementation [9]. Now with
a list of neighbour words for each of the words in the document, the next step is the filtering
process. For each word in our document, each word in its neighbour list is considered.
This is a two-part filter to determine if it is a suitable word replacement based on both the
similarity in the embedding space and a language model score (lines 4–7). The embedding
space, language model, and respective thresholds are chosen by the user. Together, they
define how suitable each word swap must be in order to even be considered as a candidate
swap. Both of these threat model filters are discussed in the previous subsection and an
example selection process is detailed in Section 4.2.
The output of this stage is a list of the possible word swaps collected for each word
in the document. The next stage is to begin the genetic attack process. The user chooses
the genetic attack parameters which are the number of generations and the population size.
The number of generations determines the maximum iteration count to run the genetic
search for (line 13). The population size is how many instances of the document are used
as a pool for mutations and reproduction. At the start, these are all identical instances
of the original document which then mutate and reproduce to generate variations over
the generations (line 14). As the initial population group is the same document for each
population member, the initialization of the genetic attack has no impact on the attack
process. The genetic search always starts without any mutations applied and makes word
swaps based on the constraints applied.
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Algorithm 1 Attack Procedure
1: Preprocess Document
2: for each Word ∈ Document do
3: Neighbours = GetNeighbours(Word)
4: for each Candidate ∈ Neighbours do
5: if Embedding Similarity ≥ Embedding Score Threshold then







13: for g=1,2...G Generations do
14: for each doc ∈ Population do
15: doc = Perturb(doc)
16: score = ModelScore(doc)
17: if score ≤ Class Boundary then
18: return doc
19: else if score ¡ minScore then
20: minDoc = doc





26: return minDoc (no doc passed the threshold)
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The user also defines a completion threshold. This is the condition that needs to be
fulfilled to end the attack for each document. The scores from the classifier are normalized
between 0 and 1 and an adversary is successful once the score drops below the class boundary
of 50%. The population member that surpassed this threshold is returned as the new
document and the attack has successfully completed (lines 17–18). If the threshold is not
met before the maximum number of generations has been reached then the document with
the best score from the population pool is returned (line 26).
The perturb subroutine takes the document and makes a single word swap at random.
Once a word has been chosen as the mutation, a new instance of the document is created for
each candidate, with that word in place of the original. A set of stopwords such as common
articles and prepositions are not permitted to be swapped (e.g. ‘the’, ‘a’). Additionally,
the candidate swaps are filtered through WordNet [67] to prevent antonyms close in the
embedding space. Each new document instance is then sent to the target NLP classifier and
a classification score is returned for each document. If any of the new document variants
results in an improved score relative to the original, the best is chosen as the new document.
If not then the original is retained. This process is represented as line 15.
Reproduction is implemented as crossovers involving two members of the population
combining randomly to produce a child example containing half of the words from each
parent. This crossover is repeated, replacing all P members of the population. The purpose
of the mutations is to add diversity to the documents to more effectively explore the search
space. Reproduction is used to increase the propagation of favourable outcomes and reduce
the frequency of poor-performing documents. The likelihood of each parent reproducing is
determined by a fitness score. The fitness score is based on the output score generated from
the target classifier the algorithm is attacking. The fitness score improves as the output
score gets closer to the target class. This process is represented as line 24.
Performing the lookup for the word embeddings and language model scores for every
document perturbation in real-time can be very time-consuming. To help speed up the
time to complete attacks, the language model and word embedding scores for each word
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Algorithm 2 Preprocessing Nearest Neighbour Entries
1: Tokenize Document
2: for Word in Document do
3: Find top N Nearest Neighbours for Word
4: for Candidate in Neighbours do
5: Build copy of Document with new word
6: Index = Position of word in document
7: ED = Embedding distance from original word
8: LM = Language Model (LM) score with document
9: Newline to file: Index, Candidate, ED, LM label
10: end for
11: end for
document can be precomputed. The results are saved in a lookup table and reused for each
test. This increases the speed of both the language model and word embeddings lookup for
each perturbation. The process can be seen in Algorithm 2. To start the preprocessing for
a set of documents they are each tokenized into a list of individual words (line 1). Then
for every word of every document, the nearest neighbours of the word are loaded from word
embeddings (line 3). The embeddings used here was the word2vec embedding from the
Google News corpus [66]. To find the nearest neighbours the software Gensim [81] was used
to provide a similarity function that finds the nearest embeddings using cosine distance.
Next, each neighbour is put in place of the original word, resulting in a set of candidate
documents each containing a different swap word (line 5). Then, each document is fed into
the language model [46] and a score is produced (line 8). The language model scores the
semantic suitability of each word in the sentence based on the surrounding words. Lastly,
the results are saved to a text file with a column each for the document index, the word
position within the document, the word, the embedding distance, and the language model
score of the sentence (line 9). With these scores precomputed the only inference needed at
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attack time is the classifier decision. If this preprocessing step is not completed then for
each query to the model twice the number of inferences would need to be made: one for
the language model and then another for the classifier. A comparison of computation cost
varies by threat model and can be seen in Figure 5.4. Alternatively, the neighbours for each
word can be loaded in real-time during the attack and the language model can compute the
scores however this results in a significant increase in attack time.
It should be noted that there is a downside to preprocessing the scores. If the attack
algorithm makes swaps of words in close proximity to each other then the context window
used by the language model would be an outdated version of the sentence. This may reduce
the overall semantic suitability of the language model scores. However, as the score is a
difference between the original and swapped words, the original word and all the candidate
swaps would incur this limitation, meaning the relative difference should be minimal. What
is most important is that the same limitation is applied to every attack being done. As the
potential impact to the attack is applied consistently across all of the tests, it is a worthwhile
compromise to save significant computation time.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of the robustness evaluation framework was presented. The
framework was designed with four main requirements: flexibility, the ability to be highly
customized, guidance for the user, and interpretability tools. The framework is made of
five major components. The process starts with a user defining the adversarial simulation
with the threat modelling system. Next, the adversarial attack is run using the evaluation
methods, followed by using the proposed threat model comparison equations. Next, the user
can test adversarial defence strategies. The user also has the option of using a collection
of visualization tools to improve interpretability during each step of the process. A system
architecture was designed to implement the framework that is built using a client-server
design, with a web dashboard enabling a user to interface with the back-end. The back-
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end server contains the attack algorithm and the other necessary resources including word
embeddings, a language model and a dataset to test. As this is a proactive testing approach,
the user is assumed to also be in control of the target classifier that is repeatedly queried
for predictions.
In this chapter I also provided details on the threat modelling system. The threat model
is based on simulating the attacker’s action space which is defined by six factors: content
preservation, semantic preservation, syntax preservation, suspicion, legibility and readabil-
ity. These are high-level considerations which I then translate into quantifiable metrics by
using word embeddings and a language model. The word embeddings are used to generate
similarity scores with a range of [0-1] with a higher score meaning a greater similarity. The
language model is used to score word swaps by including the surrounding sentence as con-
text. The larger the difference between the likelihood scores, the more difference between
words. Both the word embeddings and language model constrain the attack search space,
resulting in higher quality adversarial examples. Lastly, we also discussed how the attack
process works. The attack algorithm used as part of the framework can be any black-box
attack method. In the implementation for this thesis, a genetic word swapping approach is
used. The attack begins with a group of documents known as the population which mutates
over a set of generations. Each mutation is a single word swap and after each generation.
Parents reproduce and are selected by a fitness function based on each document’s predic-
tion score from the NLP classifier. The process continues until either the score threshold of
0.50 or the maximum generation count has been reached.
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4 Experimental Design for Framework Evaluation
In Chapter 3 the robustness evaluation framework with an experimental architecture was in-
troduced. To measure the performance of the framework several experiments were designed
and executed. The evaluation design is split into two main categories, machine and person.
This means that not only is the classifier tested, but we also test the adversarial documents
on human participants. If you do tests on the classifier performance only this is not enough
as you are not considering the quality of the documents. If you test on people only this is
also not enough as you are not considering the count of how many documents were actually
successful in fooling the classifier. This chapter discusses the two designs which are run to-
gether to form our hybrid evaluation approach. Prior to running the experiments, we need
to make several choices for the evaluation. These choices are the settings for the attack
algorithm, and the thresholds to use for the threat model constraints. In this chapter, we
discuss all of the necessary steps for conducting the hybrid evaluation and making these
choices. The overall process of the evaluation can be seen in Figure 4.1. As part of the
design, we first need to choose a dataset and NLP model to test with (Step 1). This will
be the classifier that the framework user wants to test in the adversarial simulation. The
dataset is a collection of documents to be used as a sample representing a training and
testing split of data the classifier will be making predictions on. With an NLP model and
dataset chosen, the next step will be to define parameters for the attack algorithm (Step
2). In the implementation used in this thesis (described in Section 3.4), this is a genetic
search algorithm. This means we will be selecting a maximum generation count and a pop-
ulation size. The next step is to define what constraint levels will be used to evaluate the
threat model (Step 3). As described in Section 3.3 this is composed of both an embedding
similarity score and a language model score gap. By running the attack algorithm with a
wide variety of constraint levels, we will choose three levels to be used as testing for the
evaluation in Chapter 5. With the attack settings chosen and the threat model constraint










Perform attack for each
constraint level (Ch 5.1)
(Step 5)
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(Step 1)  
Select NLP model and dataset
(Ch 4.1)
Evaluation Process
Figure 4.1: Flowchart of the evaluation process. Starting from model and dataset selection (1),
the user then defines the attack settings (2), then the constraint levels (3) before performing the
actual adversarial attack (4). The user then does a human participants study (5) and combines
this with the attack performance results with equations for trade-off evaluation (6).
constraints (Step 4). Next, we run our human participants study (Step 5) followed lastly
with our evaluation equations for choosing the best option (Step 6).
4.1 Datasets and Classifier
The NLP classifier is the machine learning model that the user is attacking. Any model
can be used that provides a numerical output score. In this thesis, the task is defined as
a binary classification task where the adversary wishes to convert an input to a specific
target class to bypass a filtering system such as a hate speech filter. Due to this, only two
groups matter: the target class and everything else (or non-target class). Done in this way
a multi-class classifier could be converted into a binary classification task. Any dataset can
be used that includes a binary label associated with each document. Documents can be of
any structured data format (JSON, CSV) and length. Any extra symbols such as HTML
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can be optionally filtered out during prepossessing. The classifier can perform any type of
preprocessing on the input.
We demonstrate the framework with two classification tasks: sentiment analysis on the
IMDB movie review dataset [61] and toxic comment classification on the Jigsaw Toxicity
dataset [1]. The IMDB dataset [61] is a collection of movie reviews that are evenly split
between negative and positive classes. Each review is scored out of 10 by a human reviewer.
The review is negative if the score is less than or equal to 4/10 and positive if the score is
greater than or equal to 7/10. Neutral reviews are not available in the dataset. A score from
the classifier above 50% indicates negative sentiment and a score below 50% is a positive
review. The Jigsaw Toxicity dataset [1] is a set of online comments with classes for different
types of toxicity such as obscene, threat, insult, and identity hate. Since the goal of an
attacker is to bypass any toxicity filters we convert the task to a binary label of toxic or
non-toxic. A score from the model above 50% indicates a toxic comment and a score below
50% is a non-toxic comment.
As other related works have demonstrated, virtually all text classifiers are vulnerable
to attack [82], and there is a high transferability between attacks [109]. For this reason, I
have chosen to test on a single model type with a focus instead on datasets and constraint
levels. In my preliminary work, I found the ULMFiT classifier to be the most robust and
so I have chosen this as the single model to test. The ULMFiT classifier [43] is a transfer
learning method that is first pre-trained on a language modelling task before being applied
to the source domain dataset (IMDB or Toxic Comment). Pre-training is a process that
uses inductive transfer learning. This means that we first begin training our model on
a separate but related problem. In this case, the pretraining task is language modelling.
The process for training the ULMFiT classifier is divided into three main phases. The
first phase is a general domain language modelling task that is used to capture high-level
language properties. This is done with the Wikitext-103 dataset [64]. This data-set contains
28,595 preprocessed Wikipedia articles with over 103 million words. The next phase is the
target task language model fine tuning. This is done in a similar manner to the previous
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step with the difference being that we are now training on data from our target data-set.
For our tests this means we have two instances: one trained on the IMDB data-set [61], and
another on the toxic comments data-set [1]. This step helps fine-tune the language model
learning for our specific data-sets. The last phase is the end task classification training.
This is done using the training set and its labels.
4.2 Choosing Threat Model Constraint Levels
With an NLP model and a dataset chosen, the next step of the process is defining our threat
model. This involves selecting attack settings and threat model constraints. In this section,
we define three different levels of threat model constraints to test. We first run tests to find
which search parameters we will be using for the attack algorithm. Then tests are run on
different threshold values for our word embedding and language model constraints. These
results are then used to choose what the threshold values for our three constraint levels will
be for the evaluation done in the next chapter.
4.2.1 Genetic Algorithm Search Settings
In order to begin the attack process, we need to select which parameters we will use for
the attack algorithm. The process for selecting these parameters will differ depending on
the attack strategy chosen. As described in the background chapter, many options exist
for manipulating the document. In the implementation used for this thesis, we are using
a genetic word swapping strategy. This is the attack algorithm described in Section 3.4.
To set up a genetic attack the user chooses the evolutionary parameters which are the
number of generations and the population size. Search parameters for the attack process
have already been studied in related works [107]. Benchmarks were run with several query
budgets to find which search strategies perform best in different situations. Strategies such
as greedy techniques, beam searches and genetic methods were evaluated. It was found that
there is not a single best option as the optimal strategy depends on factors including the




Attack Success Rate: 90%
Figure 4.2: Investigation of attack search settings. We see an extreme drop-off of diminishing
returns after 30 generations and a population size of 10. After this point, negligible improvements
in the attack success rate result in much greater query counts.
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is instead focused on the threat model constraints and how this influences an adversarial
attack. For this reason, a single attack setting will be used for the evaluation of the threat
model constraints. This will separate the influence of the threat model constraints from our
choice of attack. This is important as a large challenge with ML research is the failure to
identify the cause of gains when many factors as tested at once [56]. For our tests, we wish to
leave the attack process with a strong default setting. We want to find the strongest attack
settings before reaching significant diminishing returns. This will let us focus entirely on the
threat model constraints as our study variables of interest. For our evaluations, we will be
using the attack success rate which is defined as the percentage of adversarial attacks that
are successful in fooling the classifier (Equation 1). As the focus here is on finding settings
that best fool the model, documents that fool the model without alteration (natural classifier
mistakes) are not included.
Attack Success Rate =
Number of Successful Attacks
Total Number of Attacks
(1)
The objective of this test is to find the search settings that provide the best attack
success rate without reaching significant diminishing returns which can be identified as a
flattening of the performance curve. An extremely high search budget is not ideal as this
would result in wasted computational resources. For this evaluation, both the generation
count and the population size are tested at the same time. This is done since the algorithm
needs both parameters to increase as the effective search space is a product of both options.
A high population size with a low generation count is ineffective, as well as a low population
size with a high generation count. When the genetic attack was run on both datasets, it was
found that as the number of generations gets close to 30 we get diminishing returns for the
attack success rate. For the population size, we have 10 as the point of diminishing returns.
This can be seen in Figure 4.2 where at a generation count of 30 and a population size of
10 the accuracy is 90%. This results in a potential maximum of 300 (30 × 10) queries per
document as each document attacked is a product of the generations and the population
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size. The next level has a performance of 91%, a 1% gain which is not worthwhile as the
maximum number of queries increases to 432 (36 × 12), an increase of over 44% (432/300).
For this reason, we use 30 generations as the maximum generation count and 10 as the
population size. These settings mean that for each generation, 10 adversarial documents
will be made, up to a maximum generation count of 30. If after 30 generations the attack
still does not succeed, it will be considered a failure and the next document in the dataset
will be attacked. These attack settings are similar to those used in related works [103].
4.2.2 Constraint Levels
With the attack algorithm settings now defined, the next step is to select which thresholds
of the attack constraints we wish to apply for our evaluations. Here we examine the effect of
the word embeddings and language model constraints. The word embeddings are a similarity
score with larger scores indicating more similarity and the language model scores are the
difference in the log-likelihood between two sentences with a larger difference meaning a
lower similarity. These constraints were described in more detail in Section 3.3.2. The first
step is to identify the threshold ranges of interest. To do this we test each constraint on its
own and adjust it in small increments to find the interval subset which results in most of the
change to the attack success rate. The results of the embedding score test and the language
model test can be seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. For the word embeddings, the range was 0.40
to 0.70. Anything below 0.40 permitted nearly all words and anything above 0.70 resulted
in virtually no words available. For the language model score, the range of influence was
15 or lower. Nearly all word swaps were within the score difference of 15. For this reason,
we use [0.40,0.70] as the range for the word embeddings and 15 and lower for the language
model score range.
With these ranges now defined we combined these by matching embedding intervals of
0.05 with language model intervals of 2.5. These tests resulted in 8 test levels to choose
from. Only eight intervals are tested as only the major trend-line is important. These tests





































Effect of Embedding Threshold on Attack Success Rate
Figure 4.3: Embedding score threshold test. Similarity scores are tested in 0.10 intervals from
0.10 to 1.0. Attack Success rate starts at 90% until a threshold of 0.40. From that point on,
gradually increasing the score threshold causes the attack success rate to decrease until a score
of 0.70, at which point the success rate is 0%.
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Effect of Language Model on Attack Success Rate
Figure 4.4: Language model threshold test. The Likelihood score gap is tested in intervals of 2.5
from 0 up to 22.5. From the start at the left, when allowing no score gap, this results in attacks
with no success. By gradually increasing the score threshold, the attack success rate increases
until a score of 15, at which point a maximum is reached.
59
Figure 4.5: Investigation of threshold values. Combination of both embedding threshold and
language model constraints. The selected values for our tests are circled in red. The circle for
”None” is outside the axes as it represents no constraints. Results for these tests are averaged
across both datasets. The following are the constraint levels chosen. None: A similarity score of
0 or higher and no threshold on the language model score which results in an attack success rate
of 90%. Medium: A similarity threshold of 0.50 and a language model score of 10 that has an
attack success rate of 75%. High: An embedding similarity of 0.60 and a language model score
of 5, resulting in an attack success rate of 16%.
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applied to represent the far end without testing every small interval in between.
As seen in the red circles in Figure 4.5, for our embedding similarity threshold, we
have chosen 0%, 50% and 60%. For the language model score, we have chosen unrestricted
(infinite), 10 and 5. Extremely high settings were not chosen (such as an embedding simi-
larity of 0.65 and a language model score of 2.5) as the attack success rate drops too low.
Any constraints near this level would produce far too few adversaries for our tests. With
these results, we now split our evaluation of the constraint levels into three categories: no
constraints, medium constraints and high constraints. While the threat model constraint
levels defined here combine both a word embedding and language model threshold, the user
can also test either alone if desired. To summarize, the following are the thresholds applied
for each constraint level:
• None: No embedding similarity threshold (the nearest ten neighbours per word are
used regardless of distance). The language model filter is not applied.
• Medium: Embedding similarity threshold is 50%. The language model threshold is
a difference in log-likelihood scores of less than 10.
• High: Embedding similarity threshold is 60%. The language model threshold is a
difference in log-likelihood scores of less than 5.
4.3 Human Participants Study
With all of the adversarial attack factors of the experiment addressed, the next step in the
process is the human participants study. The objective of the user study is to measure
the perceived difference in overall text quality according to three main criteria: document
class preservation, grammatical quality and semantic similarity between the original and
adversarial document. In this section, we describe the details of this study by discussing
details about the participants, the data collection procedure, and each of the tasks we
present to the participants. Each participant signed a consent form which can be seen in
Appendix B. The study was approved by our institutional Research Ethics Board.
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4.3.1 Participants
Participants for this crowdsourced study were people registered on a website that offers
remuneration for completion of micro-tasks. We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) [3],
which is the world’s largest crowdsourcing website. Mturk listed our study to its workers
and mediated payment for their participation. As the task is a crowd sourced study, there
is no guarantee about the quality of the candidates as their identity is anonymous. This
increases the uncertainty about the results of the tasks. To mitigate these issues, filters
available on MTurk were used. Using the MTurk platform filters, the task was only be
made available to participants who met the following criteria:
1. Master qualification — consistently demonstrated a “high degree of success on a wide
range of tasks” (as evaluated by the MTurk system). This reduces the variability of
the quality of the responses we will receive.
2. Participants were restricted to English speakers as self-declared to have native or near-
to-native speaker proficiency. This is to control for the interpretation of texts as being
human or machine written, which would be difficult for a novice English speaker.
3. Participants are screened to only those willing to see adult content using the “adult
content qualification” filter on MTurk. This is because some of the content in our
Toxic Comments dataset could be offensive.
4.3.2 Procedure
For both the IMDB and Toxic Comments datasets, a randomly selected subset of the data
was used as a testing set. For IMDB, 100 records were used and for Toxic Comments, 150
records were used. The different testing sizes were due to the difference in the attack success
rate between the datasets. This way we had a similarly sized evaluation set of successful
adversarial documents between the datasets.
For both of our datasets, we ran the genetic attack algorithm with the settings and
constraint levels described in Section 4.2. This produces six different testing groups: None,
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Medium and High for the IMDB dataset and None, Medium and High for the Toxic Com-
ment dataset. The number of samples in each constraint level group differs since only adver-
sarial documents that succeeded in fooling the model were presented to human participants
for evaluation.
We divide our evaluations into two main categories: attack efficiency and text quality.
Attack efficiency compares the attack success rate and average computation cost. These
are automated metrics that do not involve any human interaction. The text quality tests
involve human participants and are divided into three main categories: class preservation,
grammar quality, and semantic similarity. As the attack efficiency metrics are automatically
calculated these are not involved with the Mechanical Turk study, only the three text quality
questions need scoring by people.
Our Mechanical Turk questions were organized into batches. Each unique combination
of a dataset, constraint level and question is considered one batch. For example, the IMDB
dataset, with the medium constraints for the grammar quality task is one batch, the IMDB
dataset with high constraints for the grammar task would be another batch. The partici-
pants are not told about the origin of the data that they are evaluating. This may increase
variability of results based on context. To help address this issue, for the grammar task,
we also test the original datasets with no attacks as a baseline to compare against. In total
this results in 20 batches ((2 datasets × 3 constraint levels × 3 questions) + 2 non-attack
grammar batches).
On the Mechanical Turk platform users have the option of responding to individual
questions within each batch. For each question within a batch, we require five unique users.
This means that the number of responses per batch is five times the number of documents.
For example in a batch of 100 documents, 500 responses are obtained. Participants were
permitted to complete as many batches as they wanted. In total, across all 20 batches, 33
unique users provided over 10,000 responses. An example of the question template presented
to the participants for each task type can be seen in Appendix B.
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4.3.3 Class Preservation
For a successful attack the machine learning classifier needs to be fooled but a human reading
the text should still believe the sentiment has been preserved. To ensure that the meaning
of the document has been preserved the participants are asked to classify each document
that has fooled the classifier. Since we are performing a targeted attack that attempts to
turn a negative document into a positive classification we want to confirm that people still
perceive the text as the negative class. For our datasets that means that if a document was
a negative review or a toxic comment before manipulation then the user should decide that
this is still the case after the text has been changed. To test this we provide adversarial
documents to participants and ask them to choose either the positive or negative class. We
present each adversarial document to five users and take the count of negative responses.
This count is then averaged across all of the documents for the batch. This results in a scale
from 0-5 with 0 being the worst performance (all participants believe the class has changed)
up to 5 being a perfect score (all participants believe the class label has been preserved).
4.3.4 Grammar Quality
We are interested in whether a human reviewer would be able to identify adversarial doc-
uments and to what extent the text is deemed suspicious. To test this we ask the user to
judge the grammar of the documents and decide to what degree the text is either human or
machine-made. The participants are asked to rate the documents on a 0–5 scale as follows:
0. Completely random and clearly artificially generated.
1. Somewhat random with little meaning. Very likely artificially generated.
2. Below average grammar, probably artificially generated.
3. Average grammar, more than likely an average English speaker.
4. Good grammar but some issues. Likely a fluent speaker of English.
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5. A virtually perfect example of English writing. Almost certainly a fluent speaker of
English.
As part of the grammar assessment, we have presented the context as to whether the
text seems to be artificially made or not. It is possible that due to the user being questioned
about suspicion they are likely to provide greater scrutiny and therefore provide reduced
ratings compared to a natural assessment in the real world. To account for this we also test
the original unperturbed documents as a control group to obtain a baseline suspicion level
to compare against.
4.3.5 Semantic Similarity
To obtain a similarity score between documents, one could use automated metrics such as
chrF [80]. However, this is only a rough approximation. In order for us to obtain a more
reliable score as an approximation of similarity, we also want to directly test the impact of
the attack algorithm on human observers. In this test, we want to assess what impact our
attacks have on the overall meaning of the text. We want to ensure that the semantic quality
of the text has not been degraded. To do this we used an approach originally designed to
evaluate machine translation tasks [65]. In this case, however, instead of comparing a target
and source language we are comparing the original and adversarial texts. The participants
are asked to rate the documents on a 0–5 scale as follows:
0. The meaning is completely different or one of the sentences is meaningless.
1. The topic is the same but the meaning is different.
2. Some key information is different.
3. The key information is the same but the details differ.
4. Meaning is essentially equal but some expressions are unnatural.
5. Meaning is essentially equal and the two documents are well-formed English.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter described the process that will be used to evaluate the framework. We be-
gan by choosing an NLP model, the ULMFiT classifier [43] and two datasets to test: the
IMDB movie review dataset [61], and the Toxic Comment dataset [1]. Next, I defined how
the search settings for the adversarial attack algorithm were chosen. A maximum of 30
generations and a population size of 10 was found to be the point of diminishing returns
for the attack success rate. The next step was to select the threat model constraint levels.
First, the embedding similarity score and the language model score were tested separately
to find the range of influence on the attack success rate. With a subset identified the two
tests were combined and adjusted in 8 different intervals. From here three constraint levels
were defined: no constraints without any threshold applied to either constraint, medium
constraints which had an embedding similarity score of 50% and a language model score of
10, and high constraints which is a similarity score of 60% and a language model score of 5.
Lastly, the details of the human participants study were described. The crowdsourced
website Amazon Mechanical Turk was used to survey participants to answer three cate-
gories of questions: class preservation, grammar quality and semantic similarity. The class
preservation task asks the participant to provide a class label to each document. This test
measures if the observed class from the participant matches the true class of the original
document. If the attack algorithm modified the text too much, the labels would not match.
The grammar quality task presents the participant with the adversarial documents and asks
them to rate the overall quality and to what extent they appeared to be written by a fluent
English speaker. This is rated on a 0-5 scale with higher ratings indicating a higher quality
document. The semantic similarity task asks participants to compare the original document
before an attack to the adversarial version of that document after being attacked. The
documents are rated on a 0-5 scale with higher ratings meaning the documents are more
similar.
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5 Experiment Results and Discussion
In the previous chapter, we described the experimental design by choosing our NLP model,
dataset, attack settings and threat model constraints. This chapter includes the evaluation
results of the experiment. First, the efficiency of the attack algorithm is presented, then
the text quality tests involving the human participants study as described Section 4.3. This
represents the two main parts of the evaluation: the attack efficiency measuring the classifier
and the study of participants, measuring the human element.
5.1 Attack Efficiency
The first step in running the experiment is to attack the chosen NLP model with each
dataset (IMBD and TOXIC) for all three threat model constraints:
• None: No embedding similarity threshold (the nearest ten neighbours per word are
used regardless of distance). The language model filter is not applied.
• Medium: Embedding similarity threshold is 50%. The language model threshold is
a difference in log-likelihood scores of less than 10.
• High: Embedding similarity threshold is 60%. The language model threshold is a
difference in log-likelihood scores of less than 5.
After the attacks have been completed, we can calculate the efficiency of the attack.
Attack Efficiency, in Equation 2, is the objective measure of how feasible an attack is to
run. This is calculated as the success rate for the attack divided by the computation cost
of running the attack. The computation cost is how many queries to the NLP model must
be made for each attacked document. This is the product of the average neighbours per
word and the average generations needed per attack. This can be seen in Equation 3. The
final attack efficiency is the attack success rate divided by the compute cost calculated as


































Figure 5.1: Attack success rate for all constraint levels and both datasets.
Attack Efficiency = Attack Success Rate/Computation Cost (2)
Computation Cost = Average Neighbours per Word
×Average Generation Count
(3)
We start with the attack success rate for each constraint level and dataset. The NLP
model being attacked is the ULMFiT classifier as described in Section 4.1. The results of
the attack can be seen in Figure 5.1. The success rate for IMDB is higher than the success
rate for toxic comments for all constraint levels. This indicates that NLP models trained to
classify toxic comments are a more challenging classifier to fool. If an adversary wishes to
perform an attack on this classifier, they need either more attempts or a loosening of the
constraints. In terms of differences between constraint levels within the same dataset, the
gaps are largest between medium and high constraints at over 61.5% for IMDB and 48% for
68
toxic comments. The difference between none and medium is far less at 10.1% and 13.7%.
This suggests that applying some constraints does not severely impact the ability of the
attack algorithm to produce successful adversaries. It is only when we apply a high level of
constraints that we start to see a large increase in attack difficulty as the high constraints
has roughly one quarter the success of the attack without any constraints applied.
The next step in calculating the attack efficiency is to determine the average computa-
tion cost for generating each adversarial document. The computation cost is measured as
the number of queries made to the NLP classifier before it is fooled. To start, we examine the
average number of neighbours each word has. For every document in each dataset, we count
the number of eligible nearest neighbours that each word has. This is averaged across the
entire document and then for the whole dataset. This average number of neighbours is the
number of times the target classifier is queried with perturbed inputs for each generation.
The average neighbours for each swap word can be seen in Figure 5.2. The no constraints
condition had over a tenfold increase in the average neighbours compared to high constraints
for both datasets. This means that no constraints has an order of magnitude more choices
when perturbing the documents. The medium constraints are roughly halfway between the
other two. This provides a wide range in the count of word options and reflects the impact
of the threshold limits for each constraint level.
The second part of the computation cost comes from the average number of generations
each document needs to complete an attack. Once the target classifier has been fooled (the
score drops below 0.50) the attack process stops at whichever generation succeeded. If no
successful adversary is built within 30 generations then the next document is tried and 30
is added to the count of generations. The results for each constraint level and dataset can
be seen in Figure 5.3. The average generations needed for success rises as the constraint
levels increase. There is a large gap between high constraints and the other levels as high
constraints has a much lower attack success rate. This results in many maximum generation
counts of 30 being added to the total.
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Figure 5.4: Computational cost score calculated for each dataset and constraint level.
instance containing the candidate word. The inference time needed for the model to return
a result greatly increases the computation time needed for the attack to run. This combined
with the number of generations equals the total number of model queries per document. For
this reason, the final computation cost is the product of the average generation count and
the average number of words per neighbour (Equation 3). The final results can be seen
in Figure 5.4. The figure shows that no constraints are the most expensive to run. While
it had the fewest generations, the large increase in queries per generation resulted in the
highest cost overall. High constraints are actually the most feasible to run as even though
it has the most generations, each generation has much fewer neighbours to search, resulting
in an overall reduction in model queries. The medium constraints were between the other
two in terms of both generations and neighbour count resulting in a compute cost between
the other two.
Lastly, to calculate the overall attack efficiency we need to balance between the attack
success rate and the compute cost per document. The compute cost only tells us the average



































Figure 5.5: Attack efficiency score calculated for each dataset and constraint level.
rate from the beginning to get an assessment of how feasible it is to generate each successful
adversarial document. The results can be seen in Figure 5.5. While no constraints has the
best success rate, it has too many neighbours to consider meaning considerable wasted time
querying the model. This results in poor overall efficiency. With the high constraint level,
even though the compute cost is low the attack does not succeed often enough resulting in
poor overall efficiency. The medium constraint has the best balance of computation cost
and success rate resulting in the best attack efficiency. In conclusion, when looking at the
attack efficiency of the algorithm alone without any regard for the text quality, the medium
constraint model is the clear choice for maximizing the number of adversarial documents
that can be generated.
5.2 Class Preservation
For our first human participant task, we are measuring the ability of the attack to properly
preserve the class of the document. This means that the observed class from the partici-
pant should match the true class of the original document before the attack. This task as
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Figure 5.6: Results of the class preservation task. Number of instances per document with
observed class matching the true class. Averaged per document with each document having five
instances.
described further in Section 4.3.3. The results of the test can be seen in Figure 5.6. Across
all constraint levels, the ability for the attack to preserve the original sentiment class is
inconclusive. By running a two-way analysis of variance test we found that the effect sizes
between groups for this task are not statistically significant. The same test also found that
there is no interaction effect between dataset and constraint level (Table 5.1). Therefore, it
is reasonable to generalize beyond these two datasets to say that different constraint levels
have no statistically significant impact on the observed sentiment of the documents.
5.3 Grammar Quality
Our second human participant task is measuring the quality of the grammar. This task eval-
uates to what extent the attack process maintains proper grammar in the documents. This
task is described further in Section 4.3.4. The results of the test can be seen in Figure 5.7.
A two-way analysis of variance test is shown in Table 5.2. With Bonferroni correction for re-
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ANOVA Results - Class Preservation
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Sample 6.88 1.00 6.88 5.23 0.02 3.93
Columns 2.33 2.00 1.17 0.89 0.42 3.08
Interaction 0.65 2.00 0.32 0.25 0.78 3.08
Within 142.11 108.00 1.32
Total 151.96 113.00
Table 5.1: Two-way ANOVA Test results for both the IMDB and Toxic Comment datasets for






























None Medium High Original Data
Figure 5.7: Results of the grammar quality task. The Y axis is the average rating given across
all participants per document. The X axis is the constraint levels grouped by dataset.
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ANOVA Results - Grammar Quality
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Sample 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.58 0.06 3.89
Columns 49.15 3.00 16.38 29.27 2.11e-15** 2.66
Interaction 4.88 3.00 1.63 2.91 0.04 2.66
Within 98.52 176 0.56
Total 154.56 183
Table 5.2: Two-way ANOVA Test results for both the IMDB and Toxic Comment datasets for
the grammar quality task. *P ≤ .05, **P ≤ .005, with Bonferroni correction.
peated measures, there is no statistically significant interaction effect between the constraint
level applied and the dataset (p=0.04), meaning these findings likely generalize beyond these
specific datasets. There are however statistically significant results between the constraint
levels (2.11e-15). Table 5.3 displays pairwise t-tests for each constraint level combination
per dataset. These results show that overall for both datasets, as we increase the constraint
level we see an improvement in the grammar quality. On average, we find that the toxic
comments have a lower grammar score than the IMDB dataset. With the original unper-
turbed dataset for we find a difference of (3.8 ± 0.60) for IMDB compared to (3.4 ± 0.79)
for the toxic comments. This suggests that the type of document is a key component in
the level of grammar quality and influences how suspicious an adversary will be. Since the
overall suspicion level is dataset dependant, this is a reason that a single constraint level
should not be used when evaluating adversaries for multiple datasets. When adversarial
attack studies found in related works only use one constraint level, they are using constraint
levels that are not optimal for each specific task. This is why the methodology proposed
with this approach is useful for evaluations so that we can find constraints that work best
for any given dataset.
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Results of t Tests - Grammar Quality
Dataset Constraint 1 Constraint 2 P Value
IMDB None Medium 1.0e-02
IMDB None High 2.9e-04**
IMDB None Original 9.1e-28**
IMDB Medium High 5.5e-02
IMDB Medium Original 2.3e-20**
IMDB High Original 2.4e-06**
Toxic None Medium 2.3e-04**
Toxic None High 1.8e-08**
Toxic None Original 4.8e-26**
Toxic Medium High 7.4e-05**
Toxic Medium Original 1.4e-12**
Toxic High Original 5.7e-01
Table 5.3: Results for t tests on both the IMDB and Toxic Comment datasets for the grammar





























Figure 5.8: Results of the adversarial similarity task. The Y axis is the average rating given across
all subjects per document. The X axis is the constraint levels grouped by dataset.
5.4 Semantic Similarity
Our last human participants task is measuring the semantic similarity of the original and
adversarial documents. This test evaluates how similar the participants believe the docu-
ment is before the attack and after the document has been attacked. This task is described
further in Section 4.3.5. The results can be seen in Figure 5.8. A two-way analysis of
variance test is shown in Table 5.4. There is no statistically significant interaction effect
between the constraint level applied and the dataset (0.87), meaning these findings likely
generalize beyond these specific datasets. There is however statistically significant results
between the constraint levels (3.86e-07). Therefore, it is reasonable to generalize beyond
these two datasets to say that different constraint levels have a statistically significant effect
on the semantic quality of texts. Table 5.5, displays pairwise t-tests for each constraint level
combination per dataset. With the IMDB dataset, we find a difference of (2.4 ± 0.98) for
no constraints compared to (3.4 ± 0.76) for the high constraints. For toxic comments, the
gap is slightly larger at (2.3± 1.08) for no constraints compared to (3.5± 1.21) for the high
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ANOVA Results - Semantic Similarity
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Sample 0.19 1.00 0.19 0.20 0.66 3.91
Columns 32.33 2.00 16.16 16.55 3.86e-07** 3.06
Interaction 0.28 2.00 0.14 0.14 0.87 3.06
Within 128.94 132 0.98
Total 161.73 137
Table 5.4: Two-way ANOVA Test results for both the IMDB and Toxic Comment datasets for
the semantic similarity task. *P ≤ .05, **P ≤ .005, with Bonferroni correction.
constraints.
5.5 Discussion
Deciding which constraint level to apply depends largely on the type of environment a model
is used in and the objective of the attack. Selecting a constraint level without considering
the environment in which an attack is taking place can result in attacks or defences that
are far from optimal. In this section, I describe some criteria for choosing a constraint level
and present a set of use cases as examples.
5.5.1 Constraint Level Considerations
We have seen with the human participants class preservation task that the constraint levels
do not have any statistically significant impact on the predicted class of the document.
This however does not mean that there is no change to the perceived sentiment from the
human readers. Our preservation task is only a proxy for a real-world decision-making
process. This proxy is most appropriate for situations in which a user must make a single
decision. In certain domains such as phishing, this decision by the user can be categorized
into a binary result. For example, a success is a user being fooled to give out their personal
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Results of t Tests - Semantic Similarity
Dataset Constraint 1 Constraint 2 P Value
IMDB None Medium 3.3e-01
IMDB None High 1.3e-06**
IMDB Medium High 6.6e-06**
Toxic None Medium 3.8e-06**
Toxic None High 7.7e-05**
Toxic Medium High 7.5e-02
Table 5.5: Results for t tests on both the IMDB and Toxic Comment datasets for the semantic
similarity task. *P ≤ .05, **P ≤ .005, with Bonferroni correction.
information and a failure would be where the message is ignored or reported. This is a
simplified example however and does not consider the context in which the information is
presented. This context can impact whether or not a user takes an action. For example, an
unsolicited email appearing claiming a user needs to take action may be deemed suspicious
if the overall text quality has been degraded. To account for this we use our semantic
similarity and grammar quality tests. As seen in our grammar and semantic tests there
are statistically significant quality differences between the constraint levels. Thus, while the
document classification is not changed, all of our tests must be considered together for a
thorough assessment.
In addition, there are scenarios in which the influence is not as simple as an action
or inaction. Other domains may have a less clear distinction of failure or success. As an
example, social media manipulation attacks such as propaganda campaigns and conspiracy
theories may influence a reader to a degree but the exact influence is hard to determine. The
long-term effects of exposure to such messages may be impacted by the semantic and gram-
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matical quality as assessed by the human participant tasks. As the ratings from these tasks
decrease, the malicious information within the documents may become less of a threat as a
user may deem them more suspicious. For this reason, even slight differences in perceived
quality from our human studies have the potential for lasting impacts on the perceived in-
formation absorbed by a person. Such longitudinal impacts cannot be easily measured and
so we use the grammar and semantic quality assessments as estimates of these effects for
our decision-making process.
5.5.2 Threat Model Equations
The threat model defines the constraints for the attack but does not consider the trade-offs
between the quantity and quality of adversarial documents. Here I present a set of formulas
that can be tailored to match the user’s preferences. The Text Quality metric combines
all of the human participant tasks into one score. It represents the overall subjective mea-
sure of the perceived quality from human participants. This is a combination of the class
preservation, grammar quality and semantic similarity tasks. Each factor has an associated
weighting to apply user priorities. By default, each task is weighted evenly which results in
an even prioritization of class preservation, grammar and semantics. This can be seen in
Equation 4.
Text Quality = (Preservation × a) + (Grammar × b)
+(Semantics × c)
(4)
Now we have a unified metric for quality. However, we have no process to reconcile
these findings with our attack efficiency results. For this, we define the threat model efficacy
equation which is a combination of our high-level categories. These are the overall quality
of the resulting adversarial texts and the efficiency of running the attacks. This can be
seen in Equation 5. This equation has been organized into these two categories to clearly
separate the objective measurements related to the feasibility of running an attack with the




























Figure 5.9: Constraint Level Efficacy results for a use case focused on attack efficiency. In this
scenario, the medium constraints is best.
seen in Section 5.1 on attack efficiency. By expanding each of these categories and applying
the weightings for each we end up with four factors: Preservation, Grammar, Semantics and
Attack Efficiency. To find the most effective constraint level, one takes the results from each
test (Figures 5.5-5.8), and multiplies each with the four respective weightings (a, b, c, d).
Threat Model Efficacy = Text Quality
+Attack Efficiency × d
(5)
5.5.3 Use Cases
Assumptions made by the user will determine where priories should be given and which
equation weightings to adjust. Here I present several different scenarios to demonstrate
how one would adjust the weightings of the threat model equation for varying constraints.
We explore one with a focus on attack efficiency, one with a balance between quality and
quantity, and another focused on text quality. As our tests have shown no statistically























































Figure 5.11: Constraint Level Efficacy results for a use case focused on text quality. The high
constraints takes the lead when there is a high weighting on the text quality tests.
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zero when discussing the following use case examples. This means the weighting for factor
a is set to zero. This component has been kept in the equations however for the possibility
of tests on future data.
As our first use case, we examine a situation involving extremely large numbers of
documents. For example, a model may be deployed in a public-facing system that deals with
high traffic loads such as an email inbox. In this case, the potential for large-scale attacks
is high, such as massive spam or phishing campaigns. Even with poor quality documents,
when done on a large enough scale they may successfully influence people. With attacks
like spam or phishing, a very small success rate multiplied by millions of instances will
still result in many successful attempts. For this reason, the threat model with the highest
attack efficiency would be the most viable option. In Figure 5.9, the user has the majority
of their weighting on efficiency (d set at 80%) and has set the weights of grammar quality
and semantic similarity (b and c) to 10% each. This means the performance is scored
mostly on how efficient the attack is. The medium constraints attack is the best option for
both datasets. In general, the larger the scale of the attack, the fewer constraints would be
needed, as a small success rate can be balanced out by a large number of attempts.
Our next use case is a situation in which a balanced mix of attack quantity and quality
is desired. Such an example could be when an attacker is targeting a public discussion page
that is lightly moderated such as a page on a social media site. Since there is the potential
for more than one person to view the documents, a more even mix of text efficiency and
text quality may want to be considered. As seen in Figure 5.10, this is a situation in which
the user has no defined preferences. This means that by default there is an even weighting
between attack efficiency and text quality. The attack efficiency weighting (d) has been set
to 50% and the text quality options have also been set to a combined 50% (25% each for
b and c). For IMDB, the medium constraints attack is the best option as the scores are
higher than the other constraint levels. Even though, as seen in the previous section, high
constraints have better text quality, the poor attack efficiency reduces the overall benefit
below that of the more efficient medium constraint option. The results are different for the
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toxic comments, however, with a tie between medium and high constraints. This means
that both options would be equally effective as attack constraints for the adversary. With
an equal efficacy using either constraint level, it would make sense to opt for the higher
quality constraints to reduce suspicion of the attack.
Our last use case is a private group that has restricted access and is heavily curated. In
such a situation, the no constraints would be ineffective as our human participants would
deem these texts suspicious and therefore reject them. With a high level of scrutiny, the no
constraints model is overestimating the vulnerability of attack. A medium or high constraint
threat model would be a more appropriate fit to craft more believable documents that have
a better chance of convincing the readers. In Figure 5.11, we see a test in which the user
has put most of the weighting on the text quality options: grammar and semantics (b and
c) each at 40% and has set the weight of the attack efficiency option (d) to 20%. This
means the options are scored mainly on the quality of the text with little care as to the
efficiency of generating results. The high constraints attack is the best option as the scores
are higher than the other constraint levels, especially the no constraints option. When a
user is concerned only with the quality of the adversarial documents generated, the higher
the constraints the better.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we conducted an evaluation using the framework and interpreted the results
using the proposed equations. To start, the attack algorithm was run on the three threat
model constraint levels chosen in the previous chapter. The first evaluation was to compare
the attack success rate and it was found that no constraints had a very high success rate,
followed closely by the medium constraints, and the high constraints had a much lower
success rate. We then compared the computational cost of running the attack by comparing
the average neighbours per word and the average generations used per attack. We found that
no constraints had the highest average neighbour count but required the fewest number of
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generations to succeed. This was expected as the removal of all constraints meant all words
passed the threshold filter so the attack had the largest search space. The high constraints
had the opposite outcome: very few neighbours to select from but the attack needed many
more generations to succeed. The medium constraints were in the middle of these extremes
and overall when considering both neighbours and generations, comes out on top as the
most efficient attack when also considering the attack success rate.
We then went over the results of the MTurk human participants study. Starting with
the class preservation test, an ANOVA test found that there is no statistically significant
effect size between the constraint levels as well as no interaction effect between the dataset
and constraint levels. For the grammar quality test, the ANOVA test found no statistically
significant interaction effect but did find significant results between constraints, followed by
pairwise t-tests for each constraint level combination per dataset. These results showed that
overall for both datasets, as the constraint level is increased, there is an improvement in the
grammar quality. This was the same outcome for the semantic similarity tests as well, no
interaction effect but a statistically significant effect size between constraint levels.
For the next step of the analysis, I proposed a set of equations that can be used to
determine which constraint level is best to apply given the test results. This presents
a unified way of combing the tests for decision making. The final threat model efficacy
equation is a product of the human participant tasks and the attack efficiency, with each
factor having a weighting that can be customized by the user. I then demonstrate using the
threat model efficacy equation for three use cases: one focus on attack efficiency, one with
a balanced weighting and one with a focus on text quality. For the attack efficiency use
case it was found that the medium constraints threat model was the most effective for both
datasets. For the balanced equation, we found that the best option was dataset dependant,
for the IMDB dataset medium constraints was best, for the TOXIC dataset, it was an even
score between medium and high. For a use case focused on text quality, it was found that
the high constraints threat model was the best one to choose.
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6 Use of the Framework to Enhance Defensive Strategy
Many related works such as the survey by Zhang et al [109], have demonstrated that NLP
classifiers are very vulnerable to adversarial attacks including the attack demonstrated in this
thesis. As we have seen in the previous chapter, constraints applied to the adversarial attack
process can greatly influence how successful an attack will be. This means when evaluating
defence methods, the constraints applied to the attack process should be compared when
choosing which defence strategy to use. For this reason, the objective of this chapter is
to introduce methods of using the framework to enhance the way defensive strategies are
tested and compared. This methodology can be applied to any black-box defence approach,
meaning we can extend this process to future defensive strategies.
Adversarial training is a popular option for increasing adversarial robustness [103]. The
adversarial training process involves training the classifier on adversarial examples built from
the attack algorithm in order to increase robustness against them [38]. Adversarial training
for NLP has been studied as a solution for many attacks and has overall achieved mixed
results [103]. While some have found this approach can improve adversarial robustness, this
comes at the cost of reduced performance when the input is not being attacked [103]. This
means an improved accuracy on adversarial examples come with at least some performance
hit on the accuracy for non-adversarial inputs.
I introduce a new variant of this approach where this process is performed in an iterative
loop. Rather than perform adversarial training on all of the examples at once, I train on
a small percentage of the dataset at a time. For each iteration that passes, the attack
algorithm has to adapt to a model that has seen previous word swaps. This means that
the attack algorithm must adjust the word swaps used over time and the model learns
to be less susceptible to such attacks by retraining on seen adversarial examples. This
approach is compared to the standard adversarial training process that will only adapt once
to the attacks. By iteratively adapting the swaps, it is hypothesized that the candidate word
swaps will gradually be exhausted until no viable candidates are left and the model will then
86
have improved resilience to further attacks. Just as with the standard adversarial training
approach, this may not be a stable result and over-fitting could occur over time. Finding
the optimal balance between accuracy for adversarial examples and for inputs that are not
attacked is crucial. To address this I will examine the accuracy of the non-adversarial class
alongside the attack success rate.
In addition to over-fitting the model, another challenge with adversarial defence eval-
uation is assumptions regarding the number of adversarial inputs. Without considering
the percentage of inputs that are adversarial, we are performing an evaluation without an
essential piece of information. This prevents the NLP model owner from making an in-
formed decision on if the performance decrease is acceptable. For this reason, I introduce
an equation to evaluate the performance against a range of adversarial percentages. This
is an adjustable assumption about the percentage of adversaries expected which can help
inform which robustness trade-offs are worthwhile. This lets the model owner choose the
optimal approach amongst many options instead of settling with a poor trade-off. This can
be used with any defence method and combined with constraint levels and their impact on
attack efficiency and text quality. In addition, this process provides comparisons of various
constraint levels and justification for choosing each constraint, rather than setting a single
constraint level and only a basic accuracy test as is most common [103].
I will also extend the attack efficiency tests in Section 5.1. In that section, we were
comparing attack efficiency for a single NLP model between the different threat model
constraint levels. Now that we are retraining the model over many iterations, we can
compare how the attack efficiency changes over time as the model evolves. This gives us
an opportunity to assess how the different constraint levels compound their impact as the
number of model versions increases.
In summary, I propose a new iterative analysis approach. This is compared to the
standard adversarial training approach and a model with no defensive strategies. I will test
these three options on the three constraint levels to evaluate how effective the adversarial
training approaches are, given the various constraint levels. In addition to this, we will
87
examine how the percentage of adversaries impacts which model version we choose, how
the model over-fits on the non-adversarial class and how the efficiency of the attack process
changes as the model is retrained over the iterations.
6.1 Experimental Design
Algorithm 3 Iterative Adversarial Training Procedure
1: Get baseline model
2: for i=0,1...20 Model Iterations do
3: Run attack algorithm with random 5% subset of training set
4: Compute evaluation metrics
5: Save a snapshot of the model instance
6: Append adversarial documents to training set
7: Train New NLP Classifier
8: end for
The adversarial training approaches run in this chapter are the standard adversarial
training approach and the proposed iterative approach. These defences are compared to
a baseline model without any defence strategies employed. The NLP model type is the
same as the one used for the human participants study, the ULMFiT classifier [43]. For the
standard approach, the attack algorithm is run on every document in the training set that
is part of the target class. For the IMDB and Toxic Comment datasets, this is all of the
negative movie reviews and the comments that are labelled toxic. After all the documents
have been attacked, the resulting adversarial examples that were generated are appended
to the training set. The classifier is then retrained with this updated training set. The new
model is then attacked again and the robustness is once again measured.
The overall attack and defence process for the iterative adversarial training process can
be seen in Algorithm 3. It begins by starting with a baseline NLP model trained for the
desired classification task. This can be a brand new model or an existing model can be
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chosen (line 1). This option to start with an existing model is important for meeting the
requirement of having flexibility and being highly customized. Rather than throwing away
a model that has been specially crafted for a certain environment, we can improve it rather
than replace it. This can allow for easier deployment of more robust models. With a model
selected, evaluation metrics are collected on the model with the testing set and this is used
as the baseline comparison to future versions of the model. The training procedure is a
loop that repeatedly generates new adversarial documents to which the model adapts and
retrains over a set of iterations (line 2). Each model iteration is the result of the attack
algorithm being run on a randomly selected subset of the training set (line 3). After the
adversarial documents from the training set are generated, the NLP model is attacked with
the held-out testing set and performance metrics are calculated for this iteration (line 4).
A snapshot of the model is saved that can be reverted back to. This is a complete instance
of the model at the current iteration (line 5). Just as with the standard approach, once the
attack completes the adversarial examples are added to the original training set (line 6).
The model is then retrained, resulting in a new version of the machine learning classifier
(line 7). For the standard adversarial training approach, all of the documents are attacked
once in one batch. With the iterative approach, the process loops as many times as the
user specifies. For this demonstration the loop is repeated 20 times, attacking a 5% subset
of the examples each time. The test stops at 20 iterations to provide an equal amount
of documents for both the standard approach (1 batch with 100% of examples) and the
iterative approach (20 batches of 5%).
6.2 Performance Metrics
Classification results can be placed into four categories based on whether the predicted
class matches the true class. True positives and true negatives are the ideal results while
false positives and false negatives represent incorrect classifications. For these tests, we
represent the desired class that the adversary wants to obtain as the positive class. For our
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datasets, this means that the positive movie reviews and the non-toxic comments are the
positive class. The negative class is made up of the documents which are negative movie
reviews and toxic comments, these are the documents that the adversary is using for the
attack algorithm. The goal of the adversary is to convert NLP classifier predictions for the
negative class into predictions of the positive class. The following is a description for each
of the four possible classification outcomes:
• True Positive (TP): Both the predicted class by the classifier and the true class are
positive. This represents positive movie reviews or non-toxic comments being properly
classified.
• True Negative (TN): Both the predicted class by the classifier and the true class are
negative. This represents negative movie reviews or toxic comments being properly
classified.
• False Positive (FP): The classifier has incorrectly predicted that a negative review
or a toxic comment is a positive review or a non-toxic comment. The is the model
being fooled with an adversarial input or in a non-adversarial input, simply making a
mistake.
• False Negative (FN): The classifier has incorrectly predicted that a positive review
or a non-toxic comment is a negative review or a toxic comment. This is a possible
side effect of over-fitting our model when the non-adversarial performance degrades.
The assessments in this chapter are centred around the accuracy metric. The accuracy
is the percentage of inputs that are correctly classified. I present results with two different
versions of the accuracy metric: Non-adversarial Accuracy and Adversarial Accuracy. The
Non-adversarial Accuracy is the baseline performance when there are no adversarial docu-
ments being presented to the model. This is the decision the classifier would make under no
manipulation from a malicious actor. This is equivalent to a regular accuracy calculation
used outside the context of adversarial examples and can be seen in Equation 6. Adversarial
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Accuracy is the percentage of attacked documents that are correctly classified. This is the
performance when the documents in the target (negative) class are attacked to be converted
into the desired (positive) class. The documents that are already the desired class are not
attacked. The attacker is only running the attack algorithm on the negative class (negative
movie review or a toxic comment). Since the positive class is not considered, true positives
and false negatives can not occur and are removed from the accuracy equation as seen in
Equation 7. The adversarial accuracy is different from the attack success rate described
previously. The focus before was on finding settings that best fool the model, documents
that fooled the model without alterations (natural classifier mistakes) were not included.
Now the focus is on the real-world performance of the classifier. For this reason, both nat-
ural mistakes and adversarial attacks that fool the model after alteration are included as
misclassifications. The documents used to calculate the adversarial accuracy are perturbed
versions of the negative documents used in the non-adversarial accuracy. The datasets are
evenly balanced, this results in half of the testing set being attacked and used in the calcu-
lation of adversarial accuracy. As an example, say we have a test set of 200 examples in an
evenly balanced dataset. The non-adversarial accuracy is calculated with 100 unperturbed
positive examples and 100 unperturbed negative examples using Equation 6. Next, to calcu-
late the adversarial accuracy, the same 100 negative documents are used and this time they
are attacked to generate adversarial examples. The adversarial accuracy is then calculated
using Equation 7. As we no longer have documents from the positive class, this equates
to the true negative rate, otherwise known as specificity. As an example, if out of our 100
adversarial documents, 20 of these fooled the model, the adversarial accuracy is 80/(80+20).
This means the accuracy of our model when dealing with adversarial examples is 80%. In
total to calculate both accuracy metrics, the classifier makes predictions on 300 documents:
100 unperturbed positive plus 100 unperturbed negative for the non-adversarial accuracy
and then the same 100 negative documents are attacked for the adversarial accuracy.
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Non−AdversarialAccuracy = TP + TN






The adversarial accuracy is measured under the assumption that all of the documents
are adversarial examples. This is most likely a large overestimate of the proportion of
documents being attacked in a real-world scenario. To address this limitation, I provide a
customizable formula that takes into account the percentage of adversaries that are expected.
This can be seen in Equation 8. This is a weighted average between the non-adversarial
and adversarial accuracy. The adversarial weighting (AW) is the percentage of documents
assumed to be adversarial documents. The non-adversarial accuracy is equivalent to a
0% adversarial weighting. The adversarial accuracy is equivalent to a 100% adversarial
weighting. For example, if building a spam classifier that anticipates a majority of traffic
to be fraudulent we could set the adversarial weight to 0.90. A setting where attacks are a
rarity would assign a low weighting such as 0.05.




In the previous sections of this chapter, the various adversarial training methods were intro-
duced and evaluation metrics were explained. The next step is to run the adversarial attack
algorithm with each of the three threat model constraint levels on all three adversarial train-
ing options: no adversarial training, using the standard adversarial training approach and
lastly with the iterative approach. This results in a total of 18 tests (3 training methods ×
3 constraint levels × 2 datasets).
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IMDB Standard Adversarial Training
Constraint Level
None Medium High
Figure 6.1: Standard adversarial training compared to a baseline model with no defense training
for the IMDB dataset.
6.3.1 Standard Adversarial Training
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the results of the standard adversarial training process compared
with a baseline model with no defence methods used. For the IMDB dataset, both the
none and medium constraints have improved about 11% each. For the toxic comment
dataset, the none and medium constraints improved by about 17%. Meanwhile, adversarial
training when used with high constraints reduces the accuracy. I hypothesize that as the
robustness is already significantly higher than the other constraint levels, there is less room
for improvement. Compare this to the none and medium constraint models which start off
much less robust, leading to easy gains by learning from a larger attack search space. This
could mean that if an attacker is using a high-quality attack then adversarial training may
be less effective. Larger scale testing is needed to back up these findings and further research
could be an interesting area of future work.
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TOXIC Standard Adversarial Training
Constraint Level
None Medium High
Figure 6.2: Standard adversarial training compared to a baseline model with no defense training
for the TOXIC dataset.




















Figure 6.3: Results of the iterative loop test for no constraints using the IMDB dataset.
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Figure 6.4: Results of the iterative loop test for the medium constraint level using the IMDB
dataset.




















Figure 6.5: Results of the iterative loop test for the high constraint level using the IMDB dataset.
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Figure 6.6: Results of the iterative loop test for no constraints using the TOXIC dataset.




















Figure 6.7: Results of the iterative loop test for the medium constraint level using the TOXIC
dataset.
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Figure 6.8: Results of the iterative loop test for the high constraint level using the TOXIC dataset.
6.3.2 Iterative Adversarial Training
Figures 6.3 - 6.5 present the results of the iterative training approach for the IMDB dataset
and Figures 6.6 - 6.8 present the results of the iterative training approach for the TOXIC
dataset. Each chart contains the results for one of the constraint levels. The x-axis plots each
training iteration and the y-axis shows the accuracy of the classifier at each iteration. The
blue line represents the non-adversarial and the red line represents the adversarial accuracy.
We show the weighted accuracy as several dashed lines. The performance of the model
is calculated for adversarial weightings of 10%, 50% and 90%. Over time the adversarial
accuracy improves but eventually the model appears to over-fit and the non-adversarial
accuracy starts to decrease. For example, when looking at the non-adversarial accuracy
for the no constraints IMDB test (Figure 6.3), the performance starts at around 90% and
gradually drops to around 85%. A user would want to choose the model iteration with
the highest position on the graph for the best performance. By finding the highest point
along each line we can find the optimal model iteration given each adversarial weighting.
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Figure 6.9: Adversarial accuracy results weighted by adversarial percentage for no constraints on
the IMDB dataset.
The model iteration with the highest accuracy varies greatly depending on our choice of
weighting. For example, under no constraints using the IMDB dataset (Figure 6.3), under
no attacks or a small percent such as our 10% line, the best iteration is 3. When this
percentage is 50% or higher, our best iteration is 18.
6.3.3 Weighted Adversarial Comparison
Related works only examine the adversarial environment with the assumption that all doc-
uments are being attacked [103]. To better reflect a wide variety of attack scenarios, the
results are analyzed over a range of adversarial input percentages. I compare the results for
the standard adversarial training approach, the iterative approach, and the performance of
the original model with no defence. This is done using the weighted equation (Equation
8). When setting the adversarial weight in 0.01 intervals from 0 to 1 we obtain a graph
that better represents varying attack percentages. The dashed lines in the iterative tests
(Figures 6.3 - 6.8), represented three weightings, Figures 6.9 - 6.14 show the results when
adjusting the adversarial weighting in 1% increments. This means we calculate the highest
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Figure 6.10: Adversarial accuracy results weighted by adversarial percentage for medium con-
straints on the IMDB dataset.


















Figure 6.11: Adversarial accuracy results weighted by adversarial percentage for high constraints
on the IMDB dataset.
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Figure 6.12: Adversarial accuracy results weighted by adversarial percentage for no constraints
on the TOXIC dataset.


















Figure 6.13: Adversarial accuracy results weighted by adversarial percentage for medium con-
straints on the TOXIC dataset.
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Figure 6.14: Adversarial accuracy results weighted by adversarial percentage for high constraints
on the TOXIC dataset.
point of each line and record this as the optimal accuracy. This is then charted for all 1%
increments along the x-axis. This same operation is also done for the original model with
no defence, and the standard adversarial training. However since these other approaches
are only one model this results in a simple weighting between a single adversarial and non-
adversarial accuracy, resulting in a linear progression. For the iterative approach, we are
taking the highest point along the line for each adversarial weighting, giving us a higher di-
mensional selection for the best accuracy. This results in the non-linear performance curves
seen in Figures 6.9 - 6.14. With a low adversarial weighting, none of the approaches have a
strong lead. As the adversarial weighting increases the iterative approach becomes the best
approach with a widening gap.
6.3.4 Positive Class Performance
Accuracy has been the main criteria used in related works for evaluating adversarial machine
learning [8]. This provides a good high level overview but does not reflect any difference in
the performance between the two classes. In this section, I focus on the recall of the positive
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Figure 6.15: Positive class recall for the IMDB dataset for all three threat model constraint levels.
As the number of iterations increases, the recall for the positive class decreases from around 90%
to 80%.






















Figure 6.16: Positive class recall for the TOXIC dataset for all three threat model constraint
levels. As the number of iterations increases, the recall for the positive class decreases from
around 80% to 70%.
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class to examine how adversarial training may over-fit and worsen performance for the non-
adversarial class. To assess how well the classifier is at predicting the positive class we use the
recall metric, which is defined in Equation 9. As the classifier adapts through the iterative
training process, the classifier might be overcompensating and assigning more documents
to the negative class to avoid evasion by the adversary. For this reason the recall metric is
used to better measure how many false negatives are occurring in which positive documents
are being misclassified as negative documents. Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the recall for just
the positive class for all constraint levels using both datasets. The recall for both datasets
drops approximately 10% as the iterations approach 20. This means that compared to the
beginning of the training process, over 10% of the documents previously classified as the
positive class are now incorrectly being assigned the negative class. This suggests that the
improved performance against adversaries comes at the cost of over-fitting on the positive
class. This test demonstrates how it is also important to examine the non-adversarial class.
Performing assessments like this are especially important if the performance of the positive






Examining how the computational cost of the attacks changes over time can provide another
perspective when examining the feasibility of attacking robustness enhanced models. As the
number of model iterations increases during the iterative defence loop, the attack efficiency
can be examined. The attack efficiency metric was defined in Equation 2 as seen in Section
5.1 which is the attack success rate divided by the computation cost. The average number of
generations needed for a successful attack increases as the iteration count increases. At the
same time that the attack becomes more expensive to run, the success rate is also dropping.
Both the increase in computational cost and the decrease in success rate when taken together
drastically reduce the feasibility for an adversary to perform an attack. Figures 6.17 and
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Figure 6.17: Attack efficiency scores over each iteration of the defense loop compared for each
constraint level and training/test set for IMDB datset.




























Figure 6.18: Attack efficiency scores over each iteration of the defense loop compared for each
constraint level and training/test set for the TOXIC dataset.
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6.18 show the gradual reduction of efficiency as the model iterations increases. Shown in
the graph is both the training set used for the adversarial training as well as the test set
that has never been seen by the model. This shows that the decrease in attack efficiency
applies to both the data seen over the repeated iterations as well as the testing set which is
new to the model for each iteration. The medium constraints are the most efficient attack
process, followed by no constraints and then high.
6.4 Summary
In summary, we evaluated the standard adversarial training approach, and then introduced a
novel iterative variant to measure how different threat model constraints impact the training
process. The NLP model type is the same as the one used for the human participants study,
the ULMFiT classifier [43]. I tested two variants for adversarial training: the standard
adversarial training approach and a new iterative approach. For the standard approach,
the attack algorithm is run on every document in the training set in one batch. After the
attack algorithm is run with the input documents, the adversarial examples generated are
appended to the training set. The classifier is then retrained with this updated training set.
The new model is then attacked and the robustness is once again measured. The iterative
approach did this same process but in 5% increments, resulting in 20 iterations of the model.
After the attacks are run, I compared the results of each training approach. The
standard adversarial training approach was compared to a model with no defence strategy.
The no constraints and the medium constraint level resulted in a reduction in the attack
success rate. High constraints worsened the performance as the attack success rate improved.
For the iterative approach we saw that as the number of model versions increased, the
accuracy of the model when under attack improved, but the performance of the classifier
when handling non-adversarial inputs worsened over time. To evaluate this trade-off, we
discussed how the percentage of adversarial inputs affects the results. By comparing the
performance across many different adversarial weightings we found that the performance
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gap between the iterative approach and the standard adversarial training approach widened
as the percentage of adversaries increased.
To study the impact of the training process on the class that is not being attacked we
examined the recall for the positive class. It was observed that as the iterative training
iterations increase, the recall decreases meaning that positive documents are being classified
as negative documents. This is a likely side effect of over-fitting the attack detection of the
negative class to prevent the model from being fooled. Lastly, we examined how the attack
efficiency of the attack algorithm decreases as the iterative training approach increases the
number of model versions. The average number of generations needed for a successful attack
increases for all threat model constraint levels which results in an overall decrease in attack
efficiency. This means not only does the adversarial training process improve the robustness,
it also increases the cost of the attacker to continue attacking the classifier.
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7 Visualization for Models and Early Data Exploration
Visualizations can be used to provide better context and guidance to users of machine
learning classifiers. By better understanding the behaviour of the classifiers in use, the
trust and overall confidence in using such systems can be increased. Additionally with
greater insight into the operations of a given classifier, one can have a greater situational
awareness as to the expected regular behaviour from a model. This chapter covers my
preliminary research on visualization and explores domain-agnostic interpretability tools to
aid in classifier analysis. It presents visualization tools for model comparison and early
data exploration. This research combines visualizations with machine learning to analyze
classifier performance and behaviour.
These visualization tools could be used either before or after running an adversarial
simulation with the framework. Used before an attack these visualization tools could help
select which type of model the user wishes to evaluate for adversarial robustness. The
regular performance of a model in a non-adversarial setting can be used to set a baseline
before evaluating the adversarial performance. From this baseline, one can then begin to
evaluate the performance in different adversarial settings. The user could select the strongest
model before starting the attacks so that they have the strongest possible baseline to start
with, before continuing with the introduction of adversaries. By first obtaining a better
understanding as to how mistakes are made in any chosen classifier, one can then transition
into the addition of an adversary acting against the classifier.
An alternative use could be to compare models after being attacked with the adversarial
simulation framework and then enhanced with adversarial training. Visualization tools could
be used to compare the behaviour of different classifiers instances that have been trained
with different adversarial training methods or the same adversarial training approach, but
tested with different levels of threat model constraints. A user could investigate the cause
of model failures after attacks have been made to a classifier. In any case, once a set of
models has been trained the tools are organized into two main tasks: A high-level analysis
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Figure 7.1: Process overview for classifier performance analysis.
of classifier accuracy, and explaining individual classifier decisions. As seen in Figure 7.1,
the process involves three main stages. First, a set of candidate models are selected to
cover a variety of potential solutions. Second, the user then performs comparisons between
models and filters down results for further analysis. Lastly, the user can inspect individual
records. This chapter follows this process, starting with a discussion of generating a set of
candidate models. Next, a model-centred view is presented that allows a user to compare
the performance of various classifiers. Lastly, a data-centred view provides the ability to
investigate an individual record and see the features most unique to this record and the
predictions given by classifiers.
The datasets originally used to demonstrate these visualization tools were network
traffic packets. While the scope of this thesis is centred around text classification rather than
network data, these tools apply to both for several reasons. First, both tasks are defined as
a binary classification task where the objective is to identify the root cause of model failures.
Second, the same evaluation metrics were used for both domains. Accuracy, as well as false
negatives and false positive comparisons, are the trade-offs are assessed for each. Third,
no features specific to network traffic data is utilized. Lastly, both anomaly detection and
adversarial attacks involve a malicious user whose objective is to perform an attack that is
not identified (correctly classified) by the model. In this sense, while the packet captures
are not in the same domain as text classification, these tools translate well into my research
on adversarial attacks. The works shown in this section are high-level overview analysis
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demonstrations that apply to both domains. In fact, this work can apply to any machine
learning classification task. So while network traffic was originally used in my published
work [53], none of the contributions shown within the thesis make use of domain-specific
features. Any other machine learning domain including text classification can be applied
as well. These domain-agnostic designs helped me find the right visualization approach
for the NLP dashboard discussed in the next chapter. After developing the visualization
designs discussed in this chapter, I then started to design NLP focused visualizations that
are better tailored to the specific needs of users when examining ML models used for text
classification. The visualization tools presented in this chapter are complimentary to the
ones described in the next chapter. The tools described in this chapter can be used as a
first step for selecting an NLP model. The model owner can then use approaches in the
next chapter to dive deeper into adversarial attack and defense strategies.
7.1 Classifier Performance Analysis
This visualization tool is about building new methods to better guide a user into finding
the most appropriate robustness requirements for their specific use case. Rather than use
off-the-shelf machine-learning (ML) tools, a classifier should be custom-made by users them-
selves to properly adapt to the specific environment they wish to deploy their model. The
visualization tool proposed here is for guiding users towards choosing stronger models be-
fore beginning the adversarial simulation process. Having the user play an active role in
the development of the system can increase the chances of building trust and understanding
in a classifier [51]. This is one of the first steps towards the successful adoption of a more
robust classification model.
7.1.1 Building the Classifiers for Comparison
There are many steps involved in the data science pipeline including data preprocessing,
feature engineering, model selection and tuning model hyperparameters. All of these factors
have the potential to impact the robustness of the classifier, each impacting the trade-off
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between false positives and false negatives. Novice ML practitioners or those using advanced
deep learning models may not have the prerequisite skills for such complexity [89]. One needs
to abstract the details of the ML operation without losing functionality. Pure automation
would remove the user and produce non-optimal results, while entirely depending on the
user would be very difficult and time-consuming. A balance between the two is essential.
The process described here allows the user to increase the speed at which models can be
selected and iterated upon. The first part of the process is the testing of many different
classifier options in order to build a pool of candidate models to choose from. The generation
of the models to compare is not the focus of this chapter. Many existing strategies can be
used to construct the set of candidate models. Options include a manual grid search of all
specified parameter combinations, a random budgeted search, Bayesian optimization [28],
or one of many libraries specialized in automated machine learning.
7.1.2 Model Comparison and Filtering
The specific environment a classifier will be deployed in will determine what robustness
guarantees are needed. A public-facing system frequently accessed by individuals outside an
organization would have a much greater attack surface than an internal model servicing only
employees. This means that the robustness guarantees needed will vary greatly depending
on the cost of the model being compromised. For this reason, after all of the candidate
models have been generated, the next step is to filter down to a smaller set of models for
further investigation. An organization with an extremely low tolerance for any breaches
would focus on greater recall whereas an organization with fewer resources may be more
interested in reduced false positives over complete attack detection. This filtering stage
enables a user to define which compromises in performance versus robustness are acceptable
and find a balance most appropriate for their situation.
Given a set of models to compare, the user can select any model to investigate further
in a visual analytics dashboard. The focus here is on high-level analysis to assess the overall
performance of a model. The goal is to make it easier for the user to experiment and
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transition between different ML models. This allows the analyst to more quickly compare
approaches. Using interactive visualizations, the analyst can quickly transition between
competing models and determine which one is best to apply in a given situation. Using
these linked visualizations the user can discover patterns in the data using exploratory data
analysis. By investigating cases where the predicted class did not match the actual class,
a user can explore the data and help increase their understanding of the weak areas in
the classifier. The additional context combined with exploratory data analysis encouraged
through the interactive visualizations allows the user to more quickly identify weaknesses.
To experiment with model comparison and filtering, I designed and built the dashboard
shown in Figure 7.2. Every view (graph) used in the dashboard supports brushing and
linking of the views on the same set of data. A change to one view will change the selection
in the other linked views so that when one graph is filtered the other graphs are updated
accordingly. The dashboard enables the user to more easily compare the decisions of multiple
models by displaying the predicted score distributions. On the left side is a histogram for
each model being compared. The y-axis of the histograms is the count of the total number
of records within that bin and the x-axis is the predicted score given for each input to the
model. As an example, each histogram has a very large bin at the end indicating that
many records get classified at or near the max score of 1.0. The user can take slices of the
histograms to select only those records in a certain range of the distribution. Interactions
with histograms also filter the displayed points and associated colour encodings within the
scatterplot which is introduced next.
7.1.3 Dimension Reduction Scatterplots
As machine learning classifiers grow in complexity, the ability to understand the behaviour
of a model becomes increasingly important [69]. One needs to abstract the details of the
ML operation without losing the ability to extract actionable intelligence from the results.
Improving the understanding of the model behaviour can aid in the debugging process for
identifying classifier issues [51]. In this section, dimension reduction is used as a visualization
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Figure 7.2: Linked visualization dashboard. Left: Linked histograms of the prediction scores from
each model. Right: Scatterplot of the dimension reduction algorithm t-SNE.
tool to provide increased understanding. The user can more deeply examine the assessment
of models by visually mapping the classifier results onto scatterplots. The scatterplot is
interactive and can be brushed to filter the other linked graphs according to the selection in
the scatterplot. This will show the feature distributions in the histograms for the particular
subset of points brushed in the scatterplot.
The axes are plotted with the dimension reduction algorithm t-SNE that projects the
original multidimensional dataset into two dimensions while still retaining some high di-
mensional relationships. This allows the scatterplot to plot the two dimensions onto the
x and y axis to compare differences between data points. The scales are arbitrary with
the importance being the relative distances between points. The proximity of points is a
correlation to their similarity in the full dimension set meaning that points close to each
other have more in common than points that are a further distance apart. The points are
then colour coded based on their predicted class. A binary colour scheme is applied in this
example with green being correct (the prediction matched the true class) whereas red is
incorrectly classified. By comparing the distances between points and the class decisions
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Figure 7.3: Dimension reduction plots that colour encode classification mistakes.
made, a better understanding of the model can be obtained.
A couple of examples of the scatterplots can be seen in Figure 7.3. These are two
separate instances of the viewer showing different models. This provides a comparison
between how classifiers may distribute mistakes differently. As seen on the left, most of
the mistakes are clustered in a group near the top left whereas the other graph has errors
scattered all throughout the area. This may be an indication that the classifier on the left
can be more easily fixed whereas the other classifier has no discernible decision boundaries,
making it harder to improve. These types of insights provide the user direction as to how
to further secure the classifier. A user analyzes problem areas by brushing areas with
many mistakes and comparing that with an area with far fewer errors. The features of the
mistakes can be examined and seen in the other linked views. These types of findings are
the basis of the investigation into how susceptible a model is to adversarial examples. By
combining visualizations with machine learning evaluation one can better assess and explain
the robustness of any given classifier. When comparing models, one with more consistent
and predictable mistakes may be preferable to one with seemingly random errors. For a
model with clustered mistakes such as the one on the left, some quick fixes such as labelling
more data similar to those with the mistakes can potentially improve results whereas the
more scattered results would require a more significant alteration to the model. This can
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help a user decide which model behaves the best. When examining models with similar
robustness, this type of analysis can provide more details as to how extensive the changes for
improvement would need to be. In the example on the right, even records of close proximity
can have different class decisions, indicating that even slight perturbations of the feature
space can result in mistakes in the classifier. These visualizations showed interesting patterns
in the feature space with certain areas demonstrating tight class clusters while other regions
represented mixed class assignment resulting in non-linear decision boundaries, resulting in
many erroneous classifications.
7.2 Explaining Classifier Decisions
While the previous visualization tool provides a global view of performance, it is also im-
portant to assess how well a model is behaving with individual dataset records. The tool
presented in this section is a deeper examination of model behaviour by providing context
to any single dataset record. The goal is to provide explanations and assess the confidence
of any prediction made by a classifier. This is done with visualizations and machine learn-
ing analysis aimed at identifying feature subspaces that isolate the chosen record from the
rest of the dataset. By identifying what separates the record from its local neighbouring
points, one can better understand why the record was classified as it was. Instead of relying
completely on the analyst to find insights or using an ML classifier without context, here, a
visualization tool is proposed that will combine both approaches to take advantage of the
scale of ML with the expertise of a human analyst.
This information is provided to the user as an extension to the linked visualization
dashboard in the previous section. The objective of this section is to present methods of
understanding the underlying behaviour of model decisions for improved intuition before
addressing the adversarial robustness of a model.
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7.2.1 Contextualization Tool Overview
Over time, ML techniques have become very complex to the point where only experts of the
system can understand how the system works. It is important to have a clear explanation
as to how a certain classifier score was generated with more context than just the score as
output [94]. Without a proper understanding of the underlying properties used to produce
the prediction, it is difficult for an analyst to translate the resulting scores into information
that can be acted upon. This is challenging as advanced ML algorithms such as deep learning
act as a black box that provides little to no justification as to the results of the classifier [58].
To help reduce the complexity and time needed to analyze a classifier, it is helpful
to have the system provide extra context with a decision. This context can come from
neighbouring data provided alongside the prediction to enable exploratory data analysis.
This additional context for each record can allow for better threat intelligence. Instead of
only receiving an output score, the visualization tool provides more context such as specific
attribute subsets that separate the selected record from the rest of the data. This contextual
score combined with visual analytics shows the local context of surrounding records and
encourages exploration of the relationships of individual records within the dataset. This is
essential as the cost of poor decision making in machine learning classifiers can have serious
consequences when exploited by malicious actors in an adversarial setting. The proposed
visualization tool helps provide context and an explanation for the output score given to
any dataset record selected by the user.
Limited guidance, handling uncertainty, and trusting the results of the classifier are
issues for the limited adoption of machine learning diagnostic tools [89]. This tool aims to
address these gaps in several ways. First, the tool automatically searches for anomalous
feature subspaces to help guide the user. By aiding the user in a high-level search the user
can spend their time reviewing anomalous areas of the data rather than having to find points
of interest. Second, the tool also allows for exploration using the linked graphs at any time so
that the user can verify results helping to increase trust in the system. Lastly, the inclusion
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of multiple models at once into the dashboard can help reduce the uncertainty associated
with an individual model. This is provided in the score comparison view discussed in the
next section.
The context visualization tool is composed of two main parts: the visualization dash-
board used for interaction by the user and a back-end process that provides the contex-
tualization of any chosen record. The process begins with the user identifying a record of
interest through the visualization dashboard. Next on the back end, the process does the
context building and analysis and returns the results to the user through the dashboard.
7.2.2 Score Comparisons View
For each record processed by a typical classifier, the standard output is a label usually built
from an underlying numerical score that decides the class based on a set threshold. Without
any extra information as a way to interpret results, analysts have no idea how to fix mistakes
made by the system in order to improve it. Used as a tool for exploratory data analysis, this
contextualization tool has been built to help one better understand and compare various
machine learning approaches applied to a dataset. By providing extra context to individual
records, analysts can improve on the speed at which they can review model outputs.
Users can compare the same record score across various classifiers at once. This can
help determine if there is an issue with a particular model or whether this is a difficult
record to classify. This can also help address the transferability of adversarial attacks where
weaknesses in one model apply to other similar models as well. An example of this view can
be seen in Figure 7.4. In this example, a record is being compared against three classifiers:
the hdbscan clustering algorithm, an isolation forest and local outlier factor. While these are
the model used in this example, any classifiers can be used. The table contains three values.
First the selected record (the core record), this column shows the output score from each
model. Next is the average across the entire dataset or if a filter is applied, the matching
subset selected by the user. Last is the difference between the selected record (column 1)
and the average (column 2). This lets a user see how this score compares to the rest of the
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Figure 7.4: Top: Table of the score given by each model for the selected record. Bottom:
Selected record and its nearest neighbours.
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selected data. Using these views a user can determine whether or not the selected record is
deemed especially anomalous by any or all models.
This view can help a user diagnose any issues with the dataset prior to implementing
more advanced robustness measures. As an example, if all models fail to properly classify
a record or a group of records with similar features this could indicate an issue with the
dataset rather than the models. Issues such as inadequate features or a lack of labelled data
could be causing weaknesses in the models. By supplying more labelled examples similar to
the problem records or by crafting new feature combinations there could be a chance the
weaknesses could be improved. Then, when the user moves to the next step of adversarial
robustness a stronger baseline has been established, which could reduce the need for trading
robustness with accuracy later on.
7.2.3 Feature Subspace Scatterplots
The scatterplots seen in Figure 7.4 are an example of visualizations that were built to explain
results. Similar to the scatterplots seen in the previous section, the axes are arbitrary scales
generated through a dimension reduction algorithm. The difference with these graphs,
however, is the focus on a single record versus an overall dataset view. The scatterplots
present to the user a zoomed-in subset of the dataset that shows the selected record and
its nearest neighbours. An alternative view is to show the user-specific features on the axis
in which the record is most separated from other points. The record being investigated is
the point that has been circled in red. Using these scatterplots the analyst can determine
how similar the record is to the rest of the local neighbourhood according to these features.
This allows an analyst to understand what makes this record anomalous by visually seeing
how separated the record is from the rest of the records. By isolating records of interest in
feature subspaces, one can get a better understanding of which features may potentially be
manipulated by an adversary to fool a classifier. When viewing the records from shifting




Before beginning with an adversarial attack simulation, it can be helpful to first get a
better understanding of the target model that is being assessed. With greater insight into
the operations of the classifier that will be attacked, one can have a greater situational
awareness by reviewing the expected regular behaviour of a model. In this chapter, I have
presented domain-agnostic visualization tools to help in the early stage of model selection
and data exploration. The overall process was divided into three main parts. First, a user
obtains a set of models that they want to review. With automated machine learning search
techniques such as hyperparameter optimization, the user obtains a set of candidate models.
The end result of this first step is the selection of a set of models the user wants to compare.
With a set of models obtained, the comparison step involves using a linked visualization
dashboard that will allow the user to analyze multiple models at once. This is a model
centred view that has a histogram for each model that is linked to a shared scatterplot view
that shows the dataset plotted using a dimension reduction algorithm. The scatterplot is
colour encoded based on if the classifier made the correct prediction. The visualization tools
explored methods of identifying mistakes in the classifiers by visualizing feature spaces to
help a user understand areas of poor performance. This comparison view lets a user select
which model they want to use for the adversarial attack simulation.
The second visualization tool was a data-centred view that allows a user to select any
record and see how it was classified by all of the classifiers being compared. The scores for
the selected record and its nearby neighbours can be compared. Regardless of the features
used to build the models, dimension reduction scatterplots provide a view into the model
that can aid users in understanding how each record is separated from the rest in the dataset.
Areas of higher isolation can be a potential gap in the classifier understanding that could
be exploited by an adversarial example. Visualizations such as this can be used to test
hypotheses into the attributes of adversarial examples.
However, there are some limitations of dimension reduction approaches. Information
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loss during dimension reduction is a large concern of data scientists when using dimension
reduction tools [89]. With NLP models using word embeddings, the features are more
abstract and hard to reason about compared to the numerical attributes with a domain such
as with network traffic. For this reason, to separate attacks in text documents, NLP specific
dashboards were developed and will be presented in the next chapter. To complement the
high-level analysis tools presented here, in the next chapter I introduce visualizations built
specifically for the domain of NLP to review the results of an adversarial attack simulation
using the framework in this thesis.
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8 Attack and Defense Dashboards
From a defence perspective, if a classifier was fooled, it is considered a failure and when
a model makes the correct prediction, it is considered a success. Some works do evaluate
the semantics of the documents but only as a general high-level overview to see if, on
average, the documents can be considered semantically appropriate. This however does
not provide insight into the actual behaviour of the model and does not identify cases of
extreme semantic impairment. If an adversary was only able to fool a model if the content
and meaning have been manipulated beyond recognition then this should not be considered
a successful attack. For example under the assumption that the resulting text must not be
suspicious, a word swapping approach would be appropriate. Semantics, syntax and content
might still be impaired; this is why the user is involved in monitoring the training with the
dashboard. They can ensure that the specified threat model is being accurately reflected
in the documents produced by the attack system. While the constraints applied to the
threat modelling system should help preserve the quality of the documents, problems could
still happen occasionally. The visualizations introduced in this chapter, help to verify the
adversarial attack framework is operating as expected. This pairing combines the scalability
of the attack algorithm with the semantic insight of a human reviewer. The proposed tools
will work with any NLP classifier and without any internal knowledge about the model.
This chapter covers the adversarial attack and defence dashboard views, specially built
for NLP classification. The dimension reduction scatterplots from the previous chapter can
generalize to any domain but have less use than domain-specific tools. Compared to the
domain-agnostic tools from the previous chapter, the dashboards in this chapter visualize
the words in documents. This means that one can understand behaviour not from a high-
level dimension reduction approach, but with the actual features used by the classifier.
This work advocates semi-automation where a human remains in the loop since there is
still the requirement for analysts to review and make adjustments for both the attacker and
defender systems. This is especially important for the study of adversarial text generation as
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semantics are largely context-dependent and therefore often in need of manual user review.
In this chapter, the way I assess the overall similarity of adversarial documents to their
original instances differs from the user study in Chapter 5. When using these dashboards,
a user should expect to receive updates quickly to have a seamless experience. It would be
infeasible to conduct a user study to measure the document similarities. For this reason,
automated metrics are used to measure the difference between an adversarial document and
the original document. While not as accurate of a representation of text quality compared
to the human evaluation, the automated scores used are a more scalable method that can be
used as a proxy for real human evaluation. It is meant as an overall high-level indicator that
can be used within the dashboard to guide users in examining records with particularly high
or low scores. These dashboards are meant to be used in conjunction with the evaluation
process in previous chapters. This would then provide definitive quality assessments with
the human participants with the interpretability tools in this chapter for real-time data
exploration.
8.1 Interaction Methods
As the framework is built for black-box evasion attacks, the attack process involves repeat-
edly sending slightly perturbed inputs until the target class is reached. For this reason, an
automated approach is virtually essential as it would be extremely time-consuming for a
human to repeatedly craft new inputs. Additionally, when humans test subjects are given
the task of creating adversarial texts they have difficulty coming up with examples. When
automated approaches were tested they were found to be much better at this task [82].
However, while the algorithms are good at generating candidate solutions, they are
unable to always make the best decisions. While humans cannot build examples easily they
have a skillset complementary to the machine which is to easily select the best text among
several options [82]. Therefore, while some form of automation is needed, it is important
to have the user involved in the process. The combination of both human and machine can
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Figure 8.1: The user can interact with the attack generation through guided word replacement,
through direct editing, or by allowing the evolutionary attack to run automatically.
outperform a fully automated attack algorithm. Human intervention is also needed because
of the complexities of human language. At least some user feedback is needed to guide
the algorithms as context plays a large role in text analysis. Since word similarity is very
dependent on the context of surrounding words, we still need to rely on a human for the
final review. Adjustments are needed in situations where the classifier might choose words
that change the semantics of the text.
The assumption when working with word embeddings is that the nearest neighbours of
the words will be the ones that are the most similar semantically. However, this does not
always ensure that true synonyms will be the nearest neighbours. For example, antonyms
and hypernyms can be found close in the embedding space as they are used in similar con-
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texts as the original word. The word embedding similarity and language models scores used
as threat model constraints help to prevent improper swaps. These constraints, however, do
not guarantee nearest neighbours are truly similar. Even when words are proper synonyms,
other challenges such as words with multiple meanings complicate the simple word swapping
approach. It is for this reason that the attack has been integrated with a human-centred
visual analytics dashboard to allow the user to make changes as needed. The automation
of the attack algorithm needs to be combined with the subjective insights of a human user.
For these reasons, the framework supports three methods of interaction: using the
evolutionary attack algorithm (automated), with nearest neighbour exploration (guided)
and manually through the text form view (direct). These options can be seen in Figure 8.1.
The suggested interaction order is to first run an automated evolutionary attack followed
by guided scatterplot suggestions. If there are still issues with the text then the user can
directly edit the text. The user is free to use any combination of these methods and in
any order. The manual and guided interactions offer direct manipulation of the system
without having to launch an entire attack. This can be useful to test a quick hypothesis
or troubleshoot the system. The user can also begin another automated stage using the
evolutionary attack with the current edits used as a new starting position. To prevent the
algorithm from simply switching back the words the user has changed, any words edited
by the user are automatically locked. This lock prevents the algorithm from making any
further changes to these words.
8.2 Dashboard Description
The combination of an automated algorithm working together with a human analyst provides
a good opportunity to use visual analytics to more easily integrate together the two parts.
As seen in Figure 8.2 the dashboard is organized into seven parts. All of these components
are connected together in a single linked visualization dashboard. Across the top is the
attack configuration settings (A). Below this, the line chart (B) tracks the score of the
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Figure 8.2: A linked visualization dashboard comprised of seven main components: The settings
area (A), a line chart for tracking the completion condition (B), an event log of previous inter-
actions (C), document views for the adversarial text (D) and original text (E), a scatterplot to
suggest alternative word replacements (F), a text field for manual word substitution (G).
classifier or any other completion condition. Below this, an interactive table logs progress
and enables the loading of previous snapshots (C). The center displays the adversarial (D)
and original (E) documents. On the right is the scatterplot view (F) for selecting word
replacements. Manual word replacements can be done with the input field (G). When an
attack has been started, the algorithm iterates through all of the generations and provides
an update after each generation is complete. The best document from each generation is
known as the elite and is used to represent the progress of the attack. The server updates
the dashboard with this elite. The document view, the line chart and the event log are
updated for each generation in real-time as the attack progresses.
8.2.1 Document View
The document view shows the current state of the adversarial document (Figure 8.2.D) as
well as the original text (Figure 8.2.E). While the attack algorithm is running, this view
is updated to display the best document (elite) from each generation. Once the attack
algorithm has been completed, the final adversarial document is presented to the user.
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Figure 8.3: Document view encoding options. The scoring options (A-C) can be paired with the
original document (D).
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The words within the adversarial document can be visually encoded according to several
objectives: classifier score influence, word selection count or semantic quality. These options
can be used individually or in a combination.
The words that have been changed between the original and adversarial document are
coloured blue in the original document for quick identification. I experimented with an
earlier design that also coloured the swapped words in the adversarial document. This
however would add an additional colour element to the adversarial document encodings
described below which would likely be overwhelming for a user. The same position for each
word within the adversarial and original texts is linked together. When the user hovers over
each word, both words in that same position are highlighted. This allows the user to easily
orient themselves with the same word position in both texts at once.
The score encoding shows the impact the words have on the classifier score. The score
is calculated for every word by replacing each word with the word’s nearest neighbour in the
embedding space. The document is scored by the classifier before and after the word has
been swapped. The final score is the difference in score between the first word and the new
swapped word. For example, if the current word is ‘bad’, the nearest neighbour ‘terrible’ is
put in that position instead. Two instances of the document are then scored, one for ’bad’
and once as ‘terrible’. The difference in scores is kept and is represented as the opacity of
the original word. This comparison provides a rough approximation as to the importance
of each word and lets the user easily spot good candidates for score improvements. The
context of classifier score differences is from an adversarial perspective. Improving the score
means to lower the prediction score towards the target class (from negative to a positive
movie review). If the swap improved the score it would be given a higher opacity and a
reduced score would have a lower opacity. As seen Figure 8.3.A, words such as ‘Clearly’ and
‘certainly’ would be good candidates whereas words such as ‘acting’ and ‘story’ would not.
The word selection encoding represents the count of nearby neighbours for each word
in the document. This is calculated as the number of words nearby in the embedding space
within the threshold specified by the user. The number of nearby words is normalized on
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a scale based on the relative word counts of the other words in the document. Words that
share a similar meaning to many other words are likely to have a much higher count than
more unusual words. This view can enable a user to quickly see which words are more
likely to have suitable replacement suggestions available by the system without having to
load the scatterplot for each word. The background colour of the text is used to represent
the count using the Viridis blue-yellow colour scale. Words with a higher count are given a
more yellow (brighter) background colour. As seen in Figure 8.3.B, ‘very’ has many options,
‘recommend’ has some options and ‘acting’ has very few.
The last document view option is the semantic perspective that visually encodes the
words according to their probability score from a language model. This view can be used
when the user wants to improve the semantics of the text. Each word is processed by the
language model with its surrounding context to determine a probability score that reflects
how appropriate each word is in that spot. This view can help a user identify words that
are not appropriate for the sentence and that need to be changed. The brightness of the
text colour is used to represent the semantic score. Here, a lower semantic score is more
blue, which through luminance contrast with the background drives attention to words that
are better candidates for editing. As seen in Figure 8.3.C, the majority of the words have
an average score and the word ‘abysmal’ is one of the least appropriate.
The user can choose to represent one or any combination of these encodings at any time.
Once the word encodings have been calculated the user can begin to select individual words
to swap. The user can activate any word from the text by clicking on it. This word now
appears in the top right corner of the dashboard and the word replacement view is activated
with this word which is described further in the next subsection. To help the user easily
identify the selected word within the text, the selected word is given a dark background
within the document text. Whenever the user swaps a word the document view is updated.
Each word in the text is again scored by the classifier and then the encodings are updated.
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Figure 8.4: Two example scatterplots of word replacement options. Y-axis plots probability from a
language model, x-axis plots similarity score based on word embedding distance, and hue encodes
change in classifier score. Left: replacement suggestions for the word ‘awful’. Right: replacement
suggestions for the word ‘disappointment’.
8.2.2 Word Replacements
The word replacement section is on the right side of the dashboard and is where the user can
choose word replacements with either the scatterplot suggestions (Figure 8.2.F) or manually
with the text field (Figure 8.2.G). The scatterplot view is used as a guided interaction to
help users more easily identify suitable word replacements. The purpose of the scatterplot is
to see what would happen if any of the nearest neighbour candidates was chosen to replace
the current word in the adversarial text instead. This enables the user to quickly find any
appropriate replacements for the current word selected.
When a user selects a word the attack server retrieves all of the nearest neighbours of
that word within the defined distance threshold by using the word embedding space. For
each of the nearest neighbours, three scores are computed: a classifier score from the NLP
model being attacked, a probability from the language model and a similarity score. The
classifier score is calculated as the difference in score between this word and the original word
(the word that was clicked on). These score encodings function the same way as classifier
scores in the document view. That is, each word is compared to the current word in the text
129
by replacing it in the document and running it through the classifier. The embedding space
similarity score for each candidate word is computed based on the embedding distance to
the current word in the text. The similarity scores range from 0 to 1 and the implementation
is based on the Euclidean distance in the Google News corpus word2vec embedding [66].
Larger numbers indicate more similarity between this word and the current word. The
language model probability scores are compared between all the replacement candidates.
For the language model, the Google 1 billion words model is used [22]. Words that fit most
appropriately in the surrounding context will have larger scores than those that do not. The
scores are normalized between the range of 0 and 1.
Once all of the words have been retrieved and their scores computed, they are placed
on the scatterplot. The x-axis plots the similarity score and the y-axis plots the language
model probabilities. The axis for both of the scatterplot features starts at zero and increases
towards one. This means words near the origin are the least desirable for both features.
Farther out upwards and towards the right improves the semantic score and the similarity
of the words respectively. The colour brightness of the words is encoded with the classifier
scores using the d3 plasma blue to yellow colour scale. With all three features considered,
a user would ideally find bright words in the top right corner indicating similar words that
fit the context and that move the classifier score towards the target class. When a suitable
word is found the user can click on that word to use it as a replacement. The newly selected
word now takes the place of the old one and the document view updates. An alternative
design considered was giving the user the flexibility to choose which features to plot on the
scatterplot axes. For example, the change to the model score could be combined with one
of the other semantic features. I choose to keep the model scores as colour only to keep the
design and use of the interface simple. Since the primary objective of the user is to improve
semantics I believe that this extra option is not worth the increased complexity. Additionally,
keeping both positional encodings focused on semantics provides a clear distinction between
the choice impact on semantics versus adversarial performance.
Examples of scatterplots can be seen in Figure 8.4. For ‘awful’ (Figure 8.4-left) both
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the words ‘terrible’ and ‘horrible’ would be decent replacement options. They do however,
reduce the classifier score which may render the options unusable if the classifier score is
near the decision boundary. The options for ‘disappointment’ (Figure 8.4-right) are less
appropriate as there are no clear winning candidates within the top right quadrant.
The other human intervention method is to manually edit the text directly by using
the text form that allows the user to edit the underlying text directly. The user may want
to make manual edits if the word they want to use as a replacement is not suggested in the
scatterplot. Even if a word is in the scatterplot the exact version may not be appropriate
and they may want to take a word and make some small adjustments such as editing the
prefix or suffix of a word to more appropriately match the surrounding text. For instance,
the user may wish to make adjustments for issues such as proper word tense or switching
between singular and plural versions of a word. In these situations the user types in the
desired word replacement into the text box and clicks the swap word button. This achieves
the same end as clicking a word in the scatterplot.
8.2.3 Event Log
The event log (Figure 8.2.C) is an interactive data table that records every action made
by both the user and the attack algorithm. For the algorithm, an update is sent after
every evolutionary generation has completed. For the user, any word replacements either
by manual text edits or word swaps with the scatterplot view are added to the table. For
each action, the following are recorded and stored in the table: a timestamp, an event
description, the total swap count, the word mover’s distance (WMD) [52] relative to the
original document, and the score from the classifier. Each table column can be sorted by
clicking on the column header. The event log enables the user to review the impact on
the document by sorting over time, interaction type or changes on the text (swaps, WMD,
score).
When using non-linear classifiers, the user may wish to step through several interactions
in a sequence to see if subsequent choices impact past decisions. If a user wishes to revert
131
any changes done they can do so through the data table log. By clicking on any entry in the
table they can return to this snapshot. This allows users to easily revert back to previous
decisions, allowing for non-permanent interactions. This can more easily facilitate what-if
analysis by the user where they may wish to explore different options.
8.3 Demonstrations
The end objective of the adversarial attack is to take a document, which in this case is a
negative movie review, and convert it to a positive review without changing the semantics
of the text. Since the review was originally negative, a human reading the review should
still believe the review is negative even after it becomes classified positive by the machine
learning model. In this section, I demonstrate an implementation of the attack algorithm
and the process involved in adjusting an adversarial text using the dashboard. The attack
algorithm implemented is the same one used throughout the rest of the thesis which is
detailed in Section 3.4.
8.3.1 Adversarial Attack Edits
By using the attack algorithm alone the user might be training the model on adversaries that
were actually not semantically similar to the original. This would mean that the text quality
was not adequate and defence strategies could be testing on invalid adversarial documents.
In this example, the user wishes to review some of the adversarial documents that have
been generated during an adversarial attack. By making corrections to the texts with poor
semantics, the quality of the adversarial documents can be improved.
To start, the user selects the classifier score threshold as the completion constraint. The
user then generates a set of adversarial documents with different constraints, thus building
a diverse set of adversarial documents. With an adversarial dataset built, the user needs to
select which data records to investigate. They decide to look at threat model constraints
that are equivalent to the medium constraints level (0.50 embedding distance and a language
model score of 10).
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Figure 8.5: A data table lists each of the adversarial texts generated. Users can choose which
text to edit based on metrics such as word mover’s distance, the number of words swapped and
the language model scores of the word swaps.
Figure 8.5 shows an example of a data table that lists all the generated adversaries.
Options included in the table are the final word mover’s distance (WMD) [52] of each doc-
ument, the percentage of original words remaining and the average and minimum semantic
scores of word swaps using the language model. A summary score can be defined to com-
bine metrics in order to help users prioritize edits. In this instance, it is the product of the
original words remaining and the average and minimum swap scores. A higher percentage
is desirable for each category so a smaller product indicates a text with more potential
corrections to be made. The user chooses the document with the smallest summary score
which opens the document in the interactive dashboard (Figure 8.2).
With a specific record now chosen, the user will begin to examine the text and improve
the semantics. The adversarial text chosen had successfully switched classes from negative
to positive. The user now wants to confirm that the document is truly similar semantically
to the original. To quickly check for poor word substitutes that have been made, the user
selects the language model encoding in the document view. As seen in Figure 8.3.C the
user sees that the word ‘abysmal’ which replaced ‘awful’ has been identified as a word
with a poor language model score. The user also sees another replacement they wish to
fix: ‘disappointment’ has been replaced by ‘surprise’. The user feels that there are more
appropriate substitutes for these words. As discussed in Section 8.2.2, the user selects both
of these words within the document view and the results can be seen in Figure 8.4. The
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Figure 8.6: Adversarial document view with multiple encodings. Background brightness is word
neighbour count and text opacity is classifier score importance.
user chooses replacement words and repeats the process for each word they wish to correct.
When the user does not wish to use any of the suggested replacements they insert their own
word manually via the text field. In instances where the user is unsatisfied with the change
in scores, they can revert back to a previous snapshot using the event log.
The user continues to search for other words in the adversarial document to replace
until all the poor semantic words have been fixed. The user has noticed that the classifier
score has dropped beyond the threshold needed. They could launch another evolutionary
attack or make changes themselves. Since the score only needs a slight upgrade they decide
to fix it themselves. They search for the best opportunity for score changes by enabling
the performance encoding to find words that have replacements that can improve the score.
They also add the word selection count encoding to find words that are likely to have
replacements. This can be seen in Figure 8.6. They find the word ‘movie’ (line 1) has
a good opportunity to increase the classifier score (high opacity) and has many suitable
replacements (bright colour). They then repeat the process of looking for replacements in
the scatterplots. When the adversarial document has been fixed they can continue to search
through the other adversarial documents, returning to the data table in Figure 8.5 and
prioritize based on the summary scores.
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8.3.2 Attack Algorithm Adjustments
The dashboard can also be to review the attack process of the evolutionary algorithm. If
used in this way, the dashboard can act as a troubleshooting tool to help debug errors or
better optimize the attack results. To do this, the user can change the encoding option in
the document view to the word selection counts. This will visualize the number of choices
for each word during the attack to provide the user with a better understanding of how
the word swap options the attack algorithm has. The development of the attack example
can be reviewed after each generation by looking at each version of the document using the
event log. By stepping through each stage the user can see which words are being replaced
at any time in the attack. The user can jump to a snapshot in the event log and bring up
the document view.
In this example, the user wants to troubleshoot the attack algorithm. Specifically, the
user wants to know why the word ‘It’ has a high selection chance. As seen in Figure 8.6 line
2, the user observes that the selection probability for the word ‘It’ is very high which they
find strange as they thought it was added to the list of stop words to ignore. The stop list
is used for words in which there are no conceivable replacements as the word is uncommon
or has no synonyms of any form. The user notices that other instances of the word ‘it’ in
this document were scored much lower, but then realizes that this one was at the start of
the sentence so it was capitalized. This capitalized version of the word was not part of the
stop list. To fix this issue the user now adds this specific version of the word to the stop
list. Alternatively, they could make the stop list case insensitive.
8.3.3 Exploring Attack Search Space
Another use case is to use the dashboard to explore the attack search space. The user
can step through the attack process of a document and look at replacement options in
the scatterplot. The user can compare how the attack process differs when adjusting the
threat model constraint levels. To explore the attack search space, the user can look for
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words that have replacement options and that improve the score for the adversary. As an
example in Figure 8.6 bright, bold words are important to the score and with many swap
candidates. These are promising words for the attack to swap. By looking at the replacement
options in the scatterplot, the user can see if there are any words that are above the threat
model constraint thresholds. This lets the user visually explore the trade-off between the
threat model constraint levels. If there are no viable word replacements for all words in the
document, then it can be said that the model is robustness to the attack for this particular
document. The user could also experiment with a new swap selection process instead of the
random one used by default.
8.4 Defence Extension
As we have seen with the adversarial training tests in Chapter 6, the type of adversarial
training done such as the standard approach or the iterative approach, as well as the threat
model constraints applied play a large role in the final outcome of the defence for the
NLP classifiers. To help the NLP model owner better interpret the results of the adversarial
defence tests, I propose a visual analytic dashboard that lets a user investigate any individual
document to examine both the semantics of the text as well as the feature importance of
each word in a document. The adversarial document can be examined over every iteration of
the adversarial defence loop, allowing each instance of the NLP model to be compared. This
dashboard can be used to monitor the training process at the instance level to investigate and
learn about the behaviour of the attack procedure. The dashboards can be used to compare
how each defence approach classifies a document and can compare how the training process
learns to adjust to the adversarial attacks. The different threat model constraint levels can
also be compared.
This dashboard can be used to monitor the iterative adversarial training procedure
described in Section 6.1. As the process continues, the user can monitor the progress using
the visual analytics dashboard. Training would continue until the NLP classifier reached
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diminishing returns when the performance is sufficient or even starts to degrade. The
user would then deploy the version of the model that they prefer using the snapshot from
that iteration. When the adversarial training loop has been complete, the user can select
a document from the dataset to examine in more detail. To help assess semantics, an
automated scoring metric is used as a proxy for human subject evaluation. The metric
chosen is chrF [80] which is based on the character n-gram F-score and is commonly used
for machine translation. The scores range between 0 (completely unrelated) to 1 (identical).
Suggested starting points are choosing the documents from the tested dataset with the
largest classifier score gap between the adversarial document and the original, or using
the documents with the lowest semantic similarity score. This can be chosen using the
adversarial document data table as seen in Figure 8.5. Once a document is selected the user
can view the document as it was classified by each iteration of the model. The user can
review the process and run more iterations if desired. As seen in Figure 8.7 the dashboard
is organized into four parts. All of these components are connected together in a single
linked visualization dashboard. The line chart (A) tracks the model score from the classifier
for each model iteration as well as the similarity score between the adversarial document
and the original. Below this, an interactive table displays each iteration and enables the
loading of each model instance (B). The right side displays the adversarial (C) and original
(D) documents. The dashboard is presented using a consistent colour scheme across all
parts. The positive class (a score above 0.50) is represented by the colour orange and the
negative class (equal or below 0.50) is represented by the colour blue. For the IMDB dataset
demonstrated in this section, the positive class is a positive movie review and the negative
class is a negative movie review. More details on the positive and negative classes can be
found in Section 6.2.
8.4.1 Iteration Line Chart and Log
The iteration line chart (Figure 8.7.A) plots the score given to the document by each iteration





Figure 8.7: A linked visualization dashboard comprised of four main components: Line chart for
tracking the classifier score and document similarity (A), a data table which stores all model
iterations (B), document views for the adversarial text (C) and original text (D).
the decision threshold. The grey line plots the similarity score of the adversarial document
built at that iteration compared to the original document. The iteration log (Figure 8.7.B)
is an interactive data table that stores every iteration done by the defence loop. Each model
during the training process is saved allowing the user to select any document and see how
it was classified by each iteration of the model as it developed throughout the adversarial
training process. For each instance, the following are recorded in the table: the iteration
count, the score given by the model and the similarity score relative to the original document.
Each table column can be sorted by clicking on the column header. The log enables the
user to review the impact on the document by sorting over time or changes to the predicted
score or similarity score. When the user selects a row in the table that instance of the model
is loaded and the adversarial document view is updated with the version of the document
built at that time.
This table differs from the event log in the attack dashboard as each entry is a separate
version of the model classifying the document. In the other dashboard table, each entry was
a new generation of a single document against the same classifier. In this table, each entry
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is the final adversarial document being presented to a different iteration of the model. This
lets the user evaluate how the model has evolved to handle the same input.
8.4.2 Document View
The document view shows the current state of the adversarial document (Figure 8.7.C) as
well as the original text (Figure 8.7.D). The final adversarial document from each iteration
is presented to the user. The words that have been changed between the original and
adversarial document are coloured blue in the original document for quick identification.
The words within the adversarial document are visually encoded according to the classifier
score influence and a language model score. These encodings act differently than the ones
shown in the previous dashboard. In the dashboard presented here, the focus is on overall
feature importance instead of a focus only on words that fool the classifier. The model
score encoding shows the impact the words have on the classifier score for both increasing
the score in the positive direction and reducing the score towards negative and changing
the predicted class. Options for the user are three different views for this function: nearest
replacement, leave one out and LIME [84]. The nearest replacement score is calculated for
every word by replacing each word with the word’s nearest neighbour in the embedding
space. The leave one out score simply removes each word from the document and the score
change is measured. LIME builds a local linear approximation of the model and queries the
model many times, each with a different small perturbation to the text.
These options all provide a rough approximation as to the importance of each word
and lets the user investigate the behaviour of the model. The visual encoding used is the
background colour of the text with the colour being the direction the prediction is closer
towards. For example, if the score leads to a smaller score it would be coloured blue as
this indicates the negative class whereas if this word influences a larger score it is coloured
orange as this colour represents the positive class. The opacity of the background colour
indicates the magnitude of the score shift with more faded colouring indicating a smaller
change in score.
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Figure 8.8: An example of the defense dashboard when viewing an attack that the framework
has successfully defended against.
The language model score encoding is the semantic perspective that visually encodes
the words according to their probability score from a language model. This perspective is
helpful when the user wants to assess the semantics of the text. In the same process that
is used for the attack algorithm, each word is processed by the language model with its
surrounding context. This creates a probability score that reflects how appropriate each
word is in that spot. This view can help a user identify words that are not appropriate for
the sentence. The scores are encoded by colouring the adversarial swap words red when
the scores surpass the language model threshold. This can assist the user in identifying the
impact of changing the language model constraint.
8.4.3 Demonstrations
In the example shown in Figure 8.8, the classifier has been successful in preventing a classi-
fication mistake from this adversarial document. At the start, the first iteration the model
was fooled as indicated by the blue segment in the line chart representing a negative class
decision. After this iteration, the document was always properly classified as the original
class. From iterations 1 to 3 it was near the decision boundary but afterwards, the model
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Figure 8.9: An example of the defense dashboard when viewing an attack that at first has
appeared to have failed, but the adversarial document has been perturbed too greatly and is
therefore no longer a realistic threat.
was very confident in the class assigned, indicating it is very robust against this particular
example. Looking at the similarity score (grey line in line chart) we can see that the score
has dropped from 1 down towards 0.65 indicating significant semantic degradation. This
means that even as the model continues to attack the document by perturbing it greatly,
the model is still confident in its ability to properly classify the document.
In the example seen in Figure 8.9, the classifier has been unsuccessful in preventing
a classification mistake of the document. This can be seen as the line chart shows an
entirely blue line indicating that the model always classifies this document as the negative
class meaning the model has been fooled each time. However, by viewing the adversarial
document it can be seen that the meaning of the text has been lost therefore resulting
in an inaccurate assessment of defence failure. The word ’script’ has been replaced by
’Steve Zaillian’ (line 5) resulting in a document that does not make sense. This is a situation
in which based on a score assessment alone the model would appear to have failed but taking
into account semantics it can be seen that the attack was making illogical swaps.
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8.5 Summary
Once a set of adversarial documents has been built as part of an attack simulation, the user
may want to investigate at a lower level, the impact of the threat modelling options. This
chapter started with a visualization tool for exploring the attack search space of the genetic
search algorithm that has been used throughout the thesis. Demonstrated with the IMDB
dataset, the user can make corrections manually or via suggestions by the system. Using
the dashboard a user can inspect any adversarial document with an interactive document
viewer. Any word of interest can be selected by the user and all candidate swap words can
be reviewed. The suggestions are made by visually encoding the documents and providing
replacement options in a scatterplot. The scatterplot displays choices based on a similarity
score using word embeddings, semantic scores with a language model and the change to
the classifier score. The user can also type in their own document to test and watch it
evolve through its generations as the dashboard is updated in real-time. This can facilitate
what-if scenarios by adjusting the original document and seeing how the attack algorithm
responds. I also provided examples of use cases that included describing the process of
making corrections to text semantics and exploring the attack search space.
The second part of the chapter was an extension of this dashboard view to inspect the
outcome of an adversarial training process. Whereas the previous attack focused view was
on the impact of the threat modelling constraints, this dashboard view is centred around
comparing the different versions of a model as it adapts in an iterative adversarial training
approach. The words in the document that influence the score of the model are colour
encoded according to whether they increase or decrease the prediction score. Options for
score the influence include several interpretation approaches such as leave one out and LIME
[84]. By comparing the different versions of a model, the user can identify how the training
process has adapted to specific words in the documents. Two examples are demonstrated, in
the first the model has successfully defended against the adversarial example as it becomes
more confident in its prediction over time. In the second example, the document appears
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to have fooled the model but upon closer inspection, it can be seen that the semantics were
degraded significantly and so it should not be considered a legitimate adversarial example.
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9 Conclusion and Future Works
Without safeguards to protect against adversarial text classification attacks, online threats
such as hate speech, spam, and phishing messages can proliferate and cause far-reaching
societal issues. The risk of these threats means that strategies must be developed for im-
proving the robustness of NLP classifiers. As demonstrated in this thesis during the user
study, automated attack systems often degrade document quality. Therefore, it is vital to
measure the impact the attack has on the documents. An attack that fools the model but
generates arbitrary output would not be valuable. If the adversary could only fool a model
if the content and meaning have been manipulated beyond recognition, it would be rea-
sonable to expect the model to be fooled. To what degree the message has been degraded
depends mainly on people’s subjective perception of reading the text. It is essential to have
metrics for gauging the impact on the reader. Focusing entirely on text quality would also
provide ineffective results, as the attack process’s efficiency also plays an important role.
An attack that generates perfectly formed documents would not be beneficial to an attacker
if it cannot successfully fool the model or only works on a tiny percentage of documents.
Therefore a balance between the attack success rate and the quality of the text is essential.
Balancing these trade-offs depends on the attack algorithm used, the constraints applied to
the attack process, and the percentage of inputs expected to be manipulated. Existing works
on adversarial NLP focus on the accuracy of an attack, with the text quality and efficiency
of the attack being merely an afterthought. In this thesis, a framework was introduced
that extends existing attack strategies to be used within a threat modelling system. The
framework proposes a methodology for a complete evaluation that considers many different
metrics.
The novelty in my approach was the bridging of the subjective assessment of text quality
with the objective measures relating to attack efficiency. To measure the text quality, I used
a study of human participants that was divided into three questions: class preservation,
grammar quality and semantic similarity. These three separate tests allow the user to
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evaluate different aspects of text quality for more fine-tuned control. Unlike existing works
that only consider the percentage of successful adversaries, this framework also tests the
computational cost of running the attack. This gives a better picture of the actual quantity
of adversaries generated between different approaches. To measure the attack quantity,
the attack success rate and computation cost were combined. With both text quality and
quantity measured, these factors are then combined to a single score for easy comparison.
Compared to previous works, this approach offers more customization with a set of equations
that combines the test results with user-defined weightings. Using the equations, the user
selects a constraint level with the optimal balance of quality and quantity best suited for
their situation.
The framework was demonstrated with three use case examples of different constraints
on the attack algorithm. It is a black box and model-agnostic system so that it can work
with any classifier that provides an output score. I tested the threat modelling system for ad-
versarial training and introduced an iterative analysis approach. These tests demonstrated
how the framework can be used to assess any black-box adversarial robustness technique
and address important considerations beyond the attack success rate. I compared the per-
formance across a range of adversarial input weightings, examined the trade-off with the
non-attack class, and how the efficiency of the attack changed as the model was iteratively
retrained. The methodology proposed in this thesis can be used for any new black box
defence approaches that are discovered in the future.
Also presented in the thesis was the first usage of visual analytics for adversarial text
examples. As automated attack systems degrade document semantics, the user can evaluate
the resulting text quality using dashboard views for analyst review. Once an adversarial
training session has completed the user can review the training procedure and verify the
results match their intended threat model. They can inspect any adversarial example with
an interactive document viewer. By selecting a word the attack search space for that word
is displayed in a scatterplot. The scatterplot positions the words based on a similarity
score using word embeddings and semantic scores with a language model. This helps a user
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visualize both constraints on the threat model. The user can also use the defender view to see
how any given document was scored by each iteration of the classifier to review improvements
to the model. These visualization tools are a first step towards further research integrating
visual analytics with adversarial machine learning to encourage the exploration of robustness
and interpretability techniques.
The role of the user plays a large part in how these threat models and equations are
used. If the user is from an attacker perspective they would want to deploy the threat
model with the highest efficacy score using the equations. By adjusting the weights to
reflect the specific scenario the target model is deployed in and combined with assumptions
from the attacker on their goals. On the other hand, a defender would use the threat models
to determine which attacks are feasible given their assumptions of the attacker. By using
the framework from the attacker’s point of view they can better anticipate the most likely
attack type. The intention of this work was to provide a framework that improves the
security of a user that more than outweighs the benefits an attacker may have by using the
same framework.
The future development of NLP is sure to be full of exciting new discoveries and along
with those, new vulnerabilities to be exploited. Using the methodology presented in the
thesis, the response to NLP exploits can be streamlined for an improved process for the
NLP community. The defence evaluation method can be used to explore a large variety
of existing defence proposals as well as be used to guide new development for even more
robust defence methods. The visual analytics dashboards can be used alongside the learning
process to aid understanding, and share new insights into the vulnerabilities of classifiers.
This framework provides a more flexible, guided and highly customized way of assessing
robustness issues in NLP classifiers. It is a more thorough assessment, making it a more
precise way to find an optimal balance of both text quality and quantity while also improving
reproducibility. Increased understanding of the evaluation process with this framework can
enable better communication within an organization to bridge the deployment gap and
produce more secure classifiers.
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9.1 Limitations
In the proactive setting, the framework assumes we have unlimited access to the NLP
classifier being attacked. This may not be the case if the user is not the model owner.
For example, an online service may have a maximum attempt lockout if repeated queries
are interpreted as a denial of service attack. Mitigation techniques could include rate-
limiting the requests over time, a distributed attack, or slowly building a surrogate model
that emulates the online system. With a surrogate model made the attack can continue
indefinitely in an offline setting as the user now has full control of the model.
The large cost of using human participants in the user study evaluation may limit
the scalability of tests. For this reason, it may be required that automated text quality
metrics such as the ones discussed in Section 2.3 be used instead. Another possibility is
the combination of a smaller sample of people with a larger sample of automated metrics.
The particular group of participants that are used in a study can also impact the ability
to generalize about the quality of the tests and the impact of the constraints. Care must
be given to the biases added when collecting data entirely from an online crowd sourced
study. The demographics of the Mturk platform may not entirely reflect the recipients of
the adversarial documents in the real world.
While this thesis has been focused on the English language, it is important to acknowl-
edge that this only accounts for a small portion of the world’s entire population. As English
has predominantly been the focus of NLP research efforts, there exists a large potential
for advancements in other languages. This is a large limitation for research communities
of lower resource languages, without access to cheap means of developing models such as
transfer learning from existing deep learning implementations [62]. The overall methodology
of the framework proposed in this thesis should be able to accommodate other languages,
but until more NLP resources in these languages are available, there can be no guarantees
made.
When using adversarial training for improving robustness, the similarity of our test
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data to unseen future data is crucial. When newly seen data becomes more dissimilar to
our testing set this may impact the robustness of the system. As unseen vocabulary may
appear. Therefore it may be required that models are scheduled for routine reevaluation as
the data distribution changes over time. This would allow the threat models to exhaust all
viable candidate words once again. In addition, when the test data is from another source
such as a different website or topic of discussion the model may not be properly fine tuned
for that particular vocabulary, necessitating the need for further training updates.
The prediction an NLP classifier makes may not be the sole decision-making process
used by an organization. Other metadata and features unrelated to the actual words used
in the document may be used by the model as additional features, or be fed into a sep-
arate model in an ensemble or rules-based approach. To take these external factors into
consideration, the framework would need to be integrated with the internal system of an
organization. Due to IT security and intellectual property risks, most organizations would
not disclose this information. This would play to the advantage of the defender but makes
demonstrating the tool in this thesis more challenging. However, it is for this reason that
the framework was designed to be black box and model agnostic. The system is adaptable
to be integrated with any NLP classifier which can then use the text as the payload for
whichever external form factor and other metadata are needed. So while the tests in the
thesis do not directly translate into exact decisions a system may make, they can play a key
role in emulating the perturbation of the payload information. The other metadata features
would be constructed according to the specific organization using the framework.
When using the visual analytics dashboard the feature visualizations can become com-
putationally expensive. The visual encodings used for the words are done by querying the
classifier with each word to measure the influence of swapping each word. When attack-
ing a non-linear model, if any word was changed it can influence the results of any other
subsequent changes. Therefore each word must be reevaluated after any modification. This
becomes increasingly time-consuming as one increases the number of words in the text.
Some methods to mitigate this issue could include filtering unimportant words, intelligent
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prefetching, or only encoding words upon user request.
9.2 Future Work
While the framework in this thesis has been demonstrated with genetic search techniques
on sentiment analysis classifiers, these concepts and the methodology presented can be used
as a foundation for the assessment of many other adversarial machine learning challenges.
In this section, I first discuss extensions to the framework for other NLP domains and then
present ideas for adapting the methodology for malware analysis.
9.2.1 NLP Extensions
As the length of a document increases, there would be a greater chance of a person making
mistakes. Purposely emulating common mistakes could make a text appear more human.
This could come in many forms such as typographical errors based on adjacent keyboard
keys, regional spelling differences (Canada versus the U.S.) or common word mix-ups (their,
there and they’re).
While the scope of this thesis is on NLP classifiers, future work can include extending the
framework to evaluate other NLP domains such as textual entailment or question answering.
The main methodology of the framework would not need to be changed just some of the
definitions of the study questions such as a few extra constraints on factors such as preserving
named entities in documents.
In this thesis, I defined the capabilities of the attacker as word-level substitutions.
This was chosen as it is the most popular method and allows for finer tuned control of the
document by having a high degree of control over the individual words. However, there are
many other perturbation types that were not addressed for reasons of scope. At a lower
level, character-level edits could be tested. To apply constraints to these attacks, the word
embeddings and language model that have been used in thesis demonstration would not
work as edited words would now be out of the vocabulary. Sub-word based approaches
could be used to break up words and find similar chunks for similarity measurements such
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as with chrF [80]. At a higher level, small phrases or entire sentences could be replaced
at one time. This could be done with methods such as machine translation models. The
language model constraint could be used to measure similarities as this already operates at
a sentence-level scope.
An extension to the visualization dashboards could include a filter to remove options
such as different parts of speech, word tenses, or proper nouns. This could let a user more
quickly find a suitable word replacement. An extension to the current evolutionary algorithm
can include a user-steerable stage of speculative execution [32]. This extension would track
the quality of the text and will interrupt the process if a quality metric degrades past a
certain threshold. At that point, the system could present to the user various previews of
new generations to allow the user to select the best path forward.
In this thesis, the search for the optimal threat model constraint levels has been done
manually with a human subjects study for the highest quality. If a user instead wanted to
use automated text quality metrics, an alternative approach can be to combine all of the
equations in this work into an algorithm that automatically finds the best results given a
set of weightings as input.
9.2.2 Malware Analysis
While this thesis is centred around mitigating the threats of adversarial NLP, another in-
teresting area that has similar adversarial elements is malware analysis. Just as with NLP,
malware analysis involves a discrete sequence of inputs that are highly order dependant [87].
This means that switching the order of the segments can drastically impact the function of
the information. For NLP this means we cannot rearrange words in the sentence, as the
grammar would be ruined. For malware, this means that certain functions must execute in
a specific order such as first opening a file before writing to it. Individuals and organizations
are increasingly becoming exposed to cyber threats as the sophistication of automated eva-
sion strategies improves [77]. With such a large influx of information, security analysts are
not able to identify threats in a timely manner leading to exploits persisting on networks
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and only discovered once the damage has already been done [106].
To address these challenges, deep learning classifiers have become increasingly preva-
lent as key part of the detection of malware for organizations [106]. Adversarial malware
examples can be crafted that exploit weaknesses in malware classifiers, similar to adversarial
text examples [77]. In a way very similar to NLP evasion attacks, malware evasion must
follow certain constraints for an effective attack. Both malware and written language must
preserve syntax, semantics and structure. For language, too much deviation from these
constraints results in meaningless text, for malware a file may fail to properly execute if
corrupted.
To perform a malware evasion attack, an attacker may choose from a couple of strate-
gies. In one strategy they apply strong perturbations to the malware file and then perform
dynamic analysis to actually run the file and see if it still functions. Another approach would
be to apply less invasive edits, and while these may be more computationally efficient, the
larger constraints may prove less effective in delivering a malicious payload [26]. This leads
to a trade-off of strong attacks that need time-consuming dynamic evaluation versus weaker
more efficient attacks. Therefore trade-offs of quality vs attack efficiency are quite similar
to the constraints identified in this thesis. The equations proposed in the thesis may be
adapted to address these issues with malware evasion.
To analyze adversarial malware attacks, a threat modelling system could be developed
with techniques similar to the constraint system used in this thesis. Instead of being centred
around a text document attacked with word swaps, the framework could examine program-
ming code attacked with function swaps. Just like NLP word embeddings, code can be
represented in a high-dimensional vector space. A variety of code embedding techniques
have been developed [23] that can be compared with similarity scores. These code em-
beddings could be used to find nearby neighbours that perform similar functions but use
different code. Various constraints could be evaluated and compared for the best detection
rates. Adversarial training could also be tested using the methodology presented in the
thesis. Security analysts could use such a tool to experiment with different substitutions
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and see if they are valid perturbations that still execute properly while still remaining un-
detected by a classifier. If a successful adversarial example is crafted it could be converted
into a signature that can then be integrated into the system. This example could then be
later used as a heuristic for labelling future instances of the example providing more labelled
data in a continuous feedback loop.
In addition to adapting the threat model for malware analysis, the visual analytics com-
ponents could also be extended to provide custom cybersecurity dashboards. Visualizing
malware can be an effective way of letting security analysts explore data to improve their
investigation process [100]. Using some of the visual analytics concepts proposed in this
thesis, a new set of tools can be developed to aid malware analysts. Most of an analyst’s
time is spent responding to incidents which usually have priority over exploring data for
new attacks [34]. When analysts use exploratory data analysis they can both respond to
current alerts as well as answer hypotheses about the broader set at the same time. Linked
visualization dashboards have been used for network security analysis that encourages users
to discover patterns in the data [100]. Approaches such as this focus on offering useful visu-
als to help analysts gain situational awareness but do not offer any backend support for the
detection of trends. They provide interactive visualizations with the expectation that users
perform the exploratory data analysis on their own. Other types of cybersecurity visualiza-
tions are instead centred on alert visualization and act as an interface to interpret classifier
alerts. A malware classification dashboard focused on evasion attacks could combine both
approaches to provide alert visualization in combination with exploratory data analysis.
With the current document viewer, the user select words to find synonyms. In a code
view, the replacements could be different functions that have the same overall behaviour. For
example, there are often many functions that achieve the same goal such as different ways
of opening a file or saving data [93]. This means that rather than operate on a word level, a
program could be broken up into several blocks of code with alternative instructions. This
could discover code obfuscation or anti-analysis techniques. To visualize the influence of the
code segments, one could use the code embeddings to show alternative instructions and be
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encoded with colour based on the decision from a machine learning classifier or alternatively,
a count of hits based on signatures. For the scatterplot, the word embedding similarities
could be replaced with similarity distances in code embedding distances. The language
model scores could be replaced with match percentages based on fuzzing hashing logic using
a tool such as ssdeep [48]. Different dashboard views could be constructed for different
file types such as PDF files [63], executable file formats [26], or an assembly view to show
alternative hex code instructions using a view like the ones found in a disassembler. This
human in the loop approach using a visual analytics dashboard such as the ones described
could help detect threats as well as strengthen the classifier under attack.
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A Technical Specifications
When the main AttackSystem.py is loaded, an attack instance is initialized. This is instan-
tiated with instances of a nearest neighbours finder(AttackSystem.py), a set of functions for
preprocessing documents (Preprocessing.py) and an attack function (WordSwap.py). The
functionality of any of these components can be replaced by either replacing the class file
or overriding specific functions.
The visualization tools are built using a combination of Python and JavaScript that is
connected using Flask. The interactive document viewers were custom built. The scatter-
plots and line charts were done using D3.js [18] and the website formatting uses the web
template library bootstrap so that the site should be responsive and work for both desktop
and mobile. Each visualization dashboard view is a web page that is hosted on the flask
server. All interactions with the front-end interface are handled by the main flask python
module which then connects to the main module (AttackSystem.py). The server uses web
sockets to provide real time two way communication between the python back-end and the
visualization dashboard.
In addition to the flask server, a user could directly work with the python modules. The
main AttackSystem.py can be imported which also connects with the other sub-modules,
or the user can also use any the functionality from any individual component. The NLP
classifier that the attack algorithm is targeting is queried through a python class which is an
interface into the model. The classifier is first trained with Trainer.py and then serialized
into a files for storage. To run an attack the classifier is imported by the Classifier.py





















B Human Participant Study Documents
B.1 Consent Form
Consent Form to Participate in a Research Study
Title of Research Study: A Framework for Assessing the Robustness of Natural Language 
Processing Classifiers
Name of Principal Investigator (PI):  Dr. Christopher Collins
PI’s contact number(s)/email(s): 
christopher.collins@ontariotechu.ca
905.721.8668 ext. 6581
Names(s) of Co-Investigator(s), Faculty Supervisor, Student Lead(s), etc., and contact 
number(s)/email(s):
Brandon Laughlin (brandon.laughlin@ontariotechu.net)
Departmental and institutional affiliation(s):
Faculty of Science
Faculty of Business and Information Technology
External Funder/Sponsor: NSERC
Introduction
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled “A Framework for Assessing the 
Robustness of Natural Language Processing Classifiers”. Please read the information about the 
study presented in this form. The form includes details on study’s procedures, risks and benefits 
that you should know before you decide if you would like to take part. You should take as much 
time as you need to make your decision. You should ask the Principal Investigator (PI) or study 
team to explain anything that you do not understand and make sure that all of your questions 
have been answered before signing this consent form.  Before you make your decision, feel free 
to talk about this study with anyone you wish including your friends and family.  Participation in 
this study is voluntary.
This study has been reviewed by the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (Ontario Tech
University) Research Ethics Board [insert REB assigned #] on [insert date].
Purpose and Procedure:
a. I am participating in a user study that is part of an academic research project within the
scope of a PhD thesis. The purpose of the study is to assess the perceived change in text 
documents when manipulated by automated algorithms.
b. My participation is voluntary and consists in classifying and or rating the similarity of pairs of 
documents.
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c. The duration of this study depends on how many tasks I am willing to perform. The
estimated average duration of each task is 30 seconds.  A maximum of 50 tasks may be 
completed.
d. The collected data will be stored in Amazon Mechanical Turk servers and after anonymization
be released as a public dataset for an indefinite period of time.
e. My participation is voluntary and this agreement does not require me to waive my legal
rights.
Potential Benefits  : 
The research community will benefit from this study by having a better understanding of
how automated algorithms can manipulate documents and how perceivable these changes are. 
Such knowledge can inform the design of improved machine learning robustness. Any person 
who uses natural language processing systems can benefit from this research by having more 
secure text classification systems to interact with. 
Potential Risk or Discomforts:
The psychological risk is that participants may be upset or offended in reading the "toxic" 
(harmful speech / hate speech) data embedded in the study tasks. This data was collected from 
discussions on the Wikipedia platform, and thus it is possible to encounter such harmful speech 
during regular use of the internet. 
Confidentiality:
My privacy shall be respected. No information about my identity will be shared or published 
without my permission, unless required by law. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest 
extent possible by law, professional practice, and ethical codes of conduct. Please note that 
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed while data are in transit over the Internet.
To allow reproduction of the analysis results and verification of any conclusions drawn from the 
data, at the end of the study, data stripped of any personal identifiers (e.g., MTurk ID) will be 
made publicly available. I agree that my data, stripped of personal identifiers, may be used for 
secondary purposes, as a consequence of being made publicly available. 
Voluntary Participation:
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you may partake in only those aspects of the 
study in which you feel comfortable.  You may also decide not to be in this study, or to be in the 
study now, and then change your mind later for up to 4 weeks.
Right to Withdraw:  
If you withdraw from the research project at any time up to 4 weeks after your participation, any 
data that you have contributed will be removed from the study and you do not need to offer any 
reason for making this request. After 4 weeks all linking identifiers will be deleted from the data 
for publication, and it will be no longer possible withdraw. You may simply close the browser 
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window before or during the session to discontinue the study. Data is only retained from 
completed study tasks.  You can submit a written request to withdraw from the study after 
completion, addressed to the research team and containing your unique MTurk ID. In this 
scenario all submitted data will be deleted.
Compensation, Reimbursement, Incentives:
 I'll be remunerated with $0.17/task for my participation, which will be paid through
Mechanical Turk.
 Participants are compensated per task already completed and withdrawal does not affect 
past reimbursements.
Publication of Results:
The data collected during this study may be presented in publications as absolute
numbers or statistics, with any identifying information removed.
Participant Rights and Concerns:
Please read this consent form carefully and feel free to ask the researcher any questions that you 
might have about the study. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this 
study, complaints, or adverse events, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 721-
8668 ext. 3693 or at researchethics@uoit.ca. If you have any questions concerning the research 
study or experience any discomfort related to the study, please contact the researcher Christopher
Collins at christopher.collins@ontariotechu.ca or (905) 721-8668 ext. 6581. By completing this 
form, you do not give up any of your legal rights against the investigators, sponsor or involved 
institutions for compensation, nor does this form relieve the investigators, sponsor or involved 
institutions of their legal and professional responsibilities.
1. I have read the consent form and understand the study being described.
2. I freely consent to participate in the research study, understanding that I may discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty. A copy of this Consent Form has been made 
available to me.
☐  I agree
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B.2 Human Subjects Task Templates
Document Classification
IMDB Movie Reviews
Toxic Comment Classification
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Grammar Quality
Semantic Similarity
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